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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 “Our age is not an age of secularization,” according to the promi-
nent sociologist Peter Berger, but “it is an age of exuberant religios-
ity.”1 Berger’s empirical studies have verified that “[m]ost of the 
world today is as religious as it ever was, and in some places is more 
religious than ever.”2 The continued vitality of religion has motivated 
many scholars to revisit their assumptions about how religion relates 
to their disciplines. In sociology and religion,3 scholars are revisiting, 
revising, or rejecting the paradigmatic assumption that the moderni-
zation of society necessarily leads to the secularization of society.4 
                                                                                                                    
 ∗ © 2007 by Mark C. Modak-Truran. All rights reserved. 
 ∗∗ J. Will Young Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., Gustavus 
Adolphus College; J.D., Northwestern University; A.M., Ph.D., The University of Chicago. I 
thank Mississippi College for supporting my work on this Article, Franklin I. Gamwell, 
Jean Bethke Elshtain, and David A. Strauss for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
Article, and Andrew Durrett for his research assistance. 
 1. Peter L. Berger, Religion and Globalization, 4 HEDGEHOG REV. 7, 10 (2002).  
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR 
REASON (1990); JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY & TRADITION 97 (2004) (arguing that a secu-
larized modern democratic discourse does not “involve endorsement of the ‘secular state’ as 
a realm entirely insulated from the effects of religious convictions, let alone removed from 
God’s ultimate authority. It is simply a matter of what can be presupposed in a discussion 
with other people who happen to have different theological commitments and interpretive 
dispositions.”). 
 4. See, e.g., STEVE BRUCE, GOD IS DEAD: SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST (2002) (de-
fending the secularization thesis); JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN 
WORLD (1994) [hereinafter CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS] (challenging the privatization of 
religion but revising the other main postulates of the secularization thesis); Peter L. Ber-
ger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in THE DESECULARIZATION OF 
THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 2 (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999) 
(characterizing prior belief in secularization theory—“[m]odernization necessarily leads to 
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Scholars in anthropology,5 political science,6 international relations,7 
and philosophy8 have also joined in the debate about secularization 
and the changing role of religion in modern society and in their disci-
plines. For instance, in Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, philoso-
pher Hent De Vries begins his book by claiming: “That religion can 
no longer be regarded as a phenomenon belonging to a distant past, 
and that it is not a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon ei-
ther, is no longer disputed in modern scholarship.”9  
 Despite this robust reexamination of the role of religion in public 
life in other disciplines, the secularization of law arguably consti-
tutes the most widely held but least examined assumption in con-
temporary legal theory. Almost without question,10 the contemporary 
consensus assumes that the law is or should be independent of any 
                                                                                                                    
a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals”—as “mistaken”); José 
Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective, 8 HEDGEHOG 
REV. 7 (2006) [hereinafter Casanova, Rethinking Secularization] (clarifying and revising 
secularization thesis). 
 5. See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, 
MODERNITY (2003). 
 6. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, SACRED AND SECULAR: RELIGION 
AND POLITICS WORLDWIDE (2004) (empirically defending the secularization thesis); 
CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 194 (2004) (arguing that “[m]odernity is 
secular, not in the frequent, rather loose sense of the word, where it designates the absence 
of religion, but rather in the fact that religion occupies a different place, compatible with 
the sense that all social action takes place in profane time”); Charles Taylor, Modes of 
Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 46, 51-53 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998) (ar-
guing that “secularism in some form is a necessity for democratic life of religiously diverse 
societies” and proposing a new kind of secularism based on a revised Rawlsian notion of 
overlapping consensus). 
 7. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE 
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, in 
THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?: THE DEBATE 1, 4 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he clash of civili-
zations will dominate global politics” in part because of the fundamental differences among 
the seven or eight major civilizations that “are differentiated from each other by history, 
language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion” (emphasis added)). 
 8. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF RELIGION (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002); RELIGION 
(Jacques Derrida & Gianni Vattimo eds., 1996); RICHARD RORTY & GIANNI VATTIMO, THE 
FUTURE OF RELIGION (Santiago Zabala ed., 2005). 
 9. HENT DE VRIES, PHILOSOPHY AND THE TURN TO RELIGION 1 (1999). 
 10. But see MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, 
COURTS (2007) (arguing for a religious ground for human rights); Mark C. Modak-Truran, 
Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 709 (2004) [hereinafter Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law] (arguing that the 
indeterminacy of United States law requires judges to rely on religious or comprehensive 
convictions to justify their deliberation about hard cases fully, even though they can only 
provide a partial justification of their decisions in their written opinions in terms of non-
comprehensive legal norms because of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); 
Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Deci-
sion Making (2002) [hereinafter Modak-Truran, Unpublished Dissertation] (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (making a more compre-
hensive argument in support of the claim made in Reenchanting the Law, supra, about the 
role of religious beliefs in judicial decisionmaking, including a critique of Habermas from 
which portions of Parts IV & V are derived).  
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religious foundation or religious values. It is blasphemy to suggest a 
religious foundation for the law or religious convictions as a basis for 
judicial decisionmaking. Paul Kahn stresses that 
[t]he rule of law represents a turn to a secular conception of the 
state, i.e., a state severed from any dependence on a divine order. 
Law is, for us, a distinctly human creation; the Founders were 
wise, not divinely inspired. Nowhere in our conception of law is 
there an opening for theological argument. The popular will, not 
the divine will, created the legal order.11 
Kahn poignantly identifies that the secularization of law has become 
axiomatic for contemporary conceptions of law so that the religious 
legitimation of law is at best only a matter of historical considera-
tion.12 
 This notion of legal autonomy and its strong separation of law and 
religion, however, do not hold up in practice. The rancorous debate 
over the appointment of United States Supreme Court Justices and 
other judges suggests that even average citizens and legislators in-
tuitively understand that judges’ decisions about issues involving 
abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality under the United States 
Constitution depend upon their comprehensive or religious beliefs.13 
This intuition makes sense because it is consistent with the over-
whelming consensus among legal theorists (ranging from extreme-
radical deconstructionists to contemporary legal formalists)14 that the 
                                                                                                                    
 11. PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 15 (1999). 
 12 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 
19-28 (2004) (noting the movement in the West from “a law identified with Christian jus-
tice” in the Medieval period to “a general social-cultural partitioning of sacred and tempo-
ral” where “Divine law and natural law were separated from positive law, the former two 
losing their authority over affairs of state” after the Reformation and Enlightenment); 
David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 19 
(1988) (pejoratively suggesting that from its inception, the idea of international law has of-
ten been associated with a movement beyond “the inadequacies of religion” (i.e., religion 
produces war not peace) to a rational notion of law to govern the relations among the evolv-
ing nation-states). 
 13. See Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: 
Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1990) (discussing the conten-
tious public discourse surrounding the appointment and confirmation of Catholic justices 
to the United States Supreme Court); Howard J. Vogel, The Judicial Oath and the Ameri-
can Creed: Comments on Sanford Levinson’s The Confrontation of Religious Faith and 
Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107, 1108-09 (1990) (ex-
ploring the hypothetical confirmation of a Quaker and a secular moralist and the problem-
atic role of a civil religious creed that has been embodied in senators’ questions in the con-
firmation process). 
 14. The consensus ranges from extreme-radical deconstructionists, such as Anthony 
D’Amato, who have argued that even the United States constitutional requirement that 
the President be thirty-five years of age is indeterminate, Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of De-
construction: The “Easy Case” of the Under-Aged President, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 250 (1989), to 
contemporary legal formalists, such as Ernest J. Weinrib, who claim that “[n]othing about 
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law is indeterminate. The law is indeterminate because there are 
hard cases where the apparently relevant statutes, common law, con-
tracts, or constitutional law provisions at issue fail to resolve dis-
putes.  
 From a descriptive standpoint, judges must rely on extralegal 
norms to resolve hard cases, and this may result in judges relying on 
religious norms in contravention to the secularization of the law. For 
example, in a recent empirical study of judicial decisionmaking, 
Gregory Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew Morriss concluded that 
“religious affiliation variables . . . were the most consistently signifi-
cant influences on judicial votes in the religious freedom cases in-
cluded in our study.”15 As suggested by this study, the advent of legal 
indeterminacy has called into question the secularization of the law 
as a descriptive assumption. Legal indeterminacy thus shifts the 
burden of maintaining the secularization of law to normative theo-
ries of law, which require judges to justify extralegal norms without 
relying on religious convictions.  
 Jürgen Habermas understands this predicament for contemporary 
legal theory better than any other legal theorist or philosopher. 
Habermas assumes that the modern legitimation of law starts from 
the dilemma of “how can disenchanted, internally differentiated and 
pluralized lifeworlds be socially integrated if, at the same time, the 
risk of dissension is growing, particularly in the spheres of communi-
cative action that have been cut loose from the ties of sacred authori-
ties and released from the bonds of archaic institutions?”16 Unlike 
almost all other contemporary legal theorists and legal philosophers, 
Habermas explicitly identifies and discusses the importance of secu-
larization and its role in his discourse theory of law.  
 Relying on Max Weber’s social theory and sociology of law, he ar-
gues that the rationalization of society (i.e., secularization) has 
                                                                                                                    
formalism precludes indeterminacy,” Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Imma-
nent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1008 (1988). 
 15. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of 
Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 491, 501 (2004). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 120 
(2003) (noting “startling correlations” between judicial voting on gay rights and judges’ re-
ligious affiliations and arguing that “[v]alues based on personal, including ethnic and reli-
gious, background influence judicial decisions not because judges are especially willful but 
because many cases cannot be decided by reasoning from shared premises of fact and 
value”).  
 16. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 26 (William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]. One commentator has remarked that “the theo-
retical work of Habermas can be understood as an attempt to grasp the moral nature of a 
law that has lost its traditional moral foundations in a religious world view or some other 
metaphysical order.” Klaus Eder, Critique of Habermas’s Contribution to the Sociology of 
Law, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 931, 932 (1988). 
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eliminated religious and metaphysical justifications for law and has 
differentiated law from politics and morality. Once religious and 
metaphysical worldviews have been eliminated as a justification for 
law, law must be legitimated—in a seemingly paradoxical manner—
by its legality (i.e., by positive enactment according to certain formal 
procedures). Habermas concludes that “[t]he democratic procedure 
for the production of law evidently forms the only postmetaphysical 
[i.e., postreligious] source of legitimacy,” but that raises the question 
of “what provides this procedure with its legitimating force?”17 Thus, 
Habermas acutely recognizes that this descriptive account of modern 
society and law raises the normative question: Where does the le-
gitimation of modern law come from?  
 Habermas claims that legality can legitimate the law based on the 
discourse principle in the discourse of justification and that the law 
can be impartially applied in the discourse of application via the 
principle of appropriateness.18 In the discourse of justification, the 
discourse principle provides that voluntary, intersubjective agree-
ment by all those affected by a legal norm provides a basis for legiti-
mating legal norms. Rational intersubjective agreement rather than 
religion provides the legitimization of law. At the same time, Haber-
mas is uniquely aware of the importance of maintaining the inde-
pendence of law from religion, morality, and politics (i.e., a secular-
ized notion of law) despite the threats posed by legal indeterminacy 
in the application of the law. Habermas maintains that the principle 
of appropriateness and the discourse of application allow for an im-
partial application of law that is independent of religious or meta-
physical worldviews. The discourse of justification justifies legal 
norms that are then applied by judges in the discourse of application. 
Although Habermas recognizes that almost all legal norms are inde-
terminate,19 he maintains that the discourse of application does not 
reopen the question of legitimation and that judges can come to         
“ ‘single right’ decisions” in every case.20 Consequently, he claims that 
the discourse of application can produce a single right decision in all 
cases via the principle of appropriateness despite the indeterminacy 
of all legal norms and without reopening the question of legitimation.  
                                                                                                                    
 17. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 448. 
 18. In jurisprudence, legitimation or justification has to do with the question: What 
makes a law valid? Habermas claims that “[i]n the legal mode of validity, the facticity of 
the enforcement of law is intertwined with the legitimacy of a genesis of law that claims to 
be rational because it guarantees liberty.” Id. at 28. Although the following discussion will 
focus primarily on the normative aspect of rational legitimation, it assumes that legal va-
lidity involves both a factual identification of a rule as something enforced in a legal sys-
tem and a rational normative justification or legitimation of that rule.  
 19. Id. at 217. 
 20. Id. at 220. 
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 Legal scholars and philosophers have surprisingly ignored 
Habermas’s important attempt to reconcile the secularization of law 
and legal indeterminacy in his discourse theory of law. They have 
primarily focused on his descriptive theory of law, his political the-
ory, and his social theory.21 Recently, some scholars have criticized 
Habermas’s discourse of application and his treatment of legal inde-
terminacy but have not considered the relationship between the secu-
larization of law and legal indeterminacy.22  
 Accordingly, this Article focuses on Habermas’s sophisticated 
awareness of the tension between secularization of law and legal in-
determinacy and treats his discourse theory of law as a significant 
test of the feasibility of reconciling these claims. In an earlier arti-
cle,23 I criticized Habermas’s discourse of justification and his claim 
that it legitimated the law independently of a religious or metaphysi-
cal worldview. Even assuming I was misguided in that critique, this 
Article argues that Habermas’s discourse of application is incoherent 
and fails to maintain the secularization of the law in the face of legal 
indeterminacy. Given Habermas’s failure, contemporary legal theory 
needs to recognize that the widespread acceptance of legal indeter-
minacy calls into question the secularization of law as it is currently 
understood.  
 To understand Habermas’s discourse theory of law (a normative 
theory of law), it will first be necessary to set forth his social theory, 
which builds on Weber’s theory about the rationalization of society 
                                                                                                                    
 21. See, e.g., Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in Habermas’s Theory of Law, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 473, 482 (2002) (discussing rationalization of society while focusing on 
Habermas’s “ ‘communications theory of society,’ and in particular, the social-theoretical 
model of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ that Habermas uses to organize that theory”); A Discursive 
Foundation for Law and Legal Practice: A Seminar on Jürgen Habermas’ Philosophy of 
Law, 12 RATIO JURIS 329 (1999); Symposium, Exploring Habermas on Law and Democracy, 
76 DENV. U. L. REV. 927 (1999); Symposium, Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical 
Exchanges, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 767 (1996). In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas high-
lights this tension between a descriptive account of law as a social fact (a mode of coercive 
social integration) and a normative account of law as justified by a claim of reason (an in-
tersubjective agreement by all those affected). He attempts to develop this dual perspective 
to both “take the legal system seriously by internally reconstructing its normative content, 
and describe it externally as a component of social reality.” HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS 
AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 43. 
 22. See Hugh Baxter, Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 50 BUFF. 
L. REV. 205, 208 (2002) (emphasizing that “Habermas’s theory of law and democracy de-
pends upon an array of philosophical and sociological concepts developed in his earlier 
work” without recognizing that Habermas’s failure to solve the problem of legal indetermi-
nacy puts into question his social theory relating to the secularization of the law); Wesley 
Shih, Reconstruction Blues: A Critique of Habermasian Adjudicatory Theory, 36 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 331, 332-33 (2003) (noting that “very little of the literature addresses” Haber-
mas’s theory of adjudication, which “is an essential piece of Habermas’s theoretical archi-
tecture,” and conducting an “internal critique” with only attenuated discussion of the 
postreligious nature of Habermas’s legal theory). 
 23. Mark Modak-Truran, Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and the Relationship 
Between Law and Religion, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 461 (1997).   
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and includes his descriptive account of law. Habermas’s descriptive 
theory is important not only because his normative theory builds on 
it, but also because it explains the secularization of law, which ar-
guably constitutes the most widely shared but least examined pre-
supposition of contemporary legal theory. Once Habermas’s descrip-
tive account of law has been set forth in Part II, his discourse theory 
of law will be set forth in Parts III and IV. Part III concerns the dis-
course theory of justification while Part IV concerns the discourse 
theory of application. Finally, in Part V, I will argue that the dis-
course of application is incoherent and fails to maintain the seculari-
zation of the law in the face of legal indeterminacy. 
II.   SECULARIZATION AND THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 
 The theory of secularization has been part of sociology since the 
post-Enlightenment origins of the discipline. The work in sociology of 
religion by Max Weber and Émile Durkheim, two of the founders of 
modern sociology, provided the “foundations for the more systematic 
formulations of the theory of secularization.”24 Sociologist José Casa-
nova identifies “the core and the central thesis of the theory of secu-
larization” as “the conceptualization of the process of societal mod-
ernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation 
of the secular spheres—primarily the state, the economy, and sci-
ence—from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation 
and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious 
sphere.”25 In addition to the general conception, secularization may 
also refer to the actual historical processes of secularization in a par-
ticular society or the anticipated consequences of those processes on 
religion.  
 Casanova further notes that the theory of secularization reached 
“a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences” with-
out really being supported empirically.26 In fact, he argues that “the 
theory of secularization is so intrinsically interwoven with all the 
theories of the modern world and with the self-understanding of 
modernity that one cannot simply discard the theory of seculariza-
tion without putting into question the entire web, including much of 
the self-understanding of the social sciences.”27 In the 1960s, the the-
ory began to receive “more systematic and empirically grounded for-
mulations of the theory of secularization,” but by the 1980s, criticism 
began mounting because of the increasing public role of religion.28 
While Casanova still thinks the core of the theory is defensible with 
                                                                                                                    
 24. CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 4, at 17. 
 25. Id. at 19. 
 26. Id. at 17. 
 27. Id. at 18. 
 28. Id. at 19. 
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some revisions, a large group of American sociologists like Peter Ber-
ger have concluded “a whole body of literature by historians and so-
cial scientists loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially 
mistaken.” 29  
 One of the difficulties in sorting out this debate has to do with the 
different uses of the term secularization. Casanova has argued that 
the theory of secularization is better understood as having three dif-
ferent connotations. First, its most widespread current usage is to re-
fer to the “decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern socie-
ties.”30 Second, secularization is often understood as the “privatiza-
tion of religion . . . both as a general modern historical trend and as a 
normative condition, indeed as a precondition for modern liberal de-
mocratic politics.”31 Finally, “the core component of the classic theo-
ries of secularization” is the claim that secularization entails “the dif-
ferentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually 
understood as ‘emancipation’ from religious institutions and 
norms.”32  
 With respect to legal theory, the first two types of secularization, 
which have been widely criticized, are not as relevant as the third 
type of secularization as a differentiation of law from religion and 
morality.33 This process of differentiation raises several important 
questions. Does the institutional separation of the law from religious 
institutions mean that religious norms and the law are autonomous 
or separate spheres? What provides the legitimation of law without 
religion and morality? Is law reduced to power or privilege? Does the 
secularization of law mean that the legitimation of law is independ-
ent of religion? Can law have both a secular and a religious legitima-
tion?  
 I will address these questions in the discussion of secularization 
in this Part and in the discussion of legality as legitimation in the 
next Part. This Part will first set forth Max Weber’s account of secu-
larization or rationalization and its consequences for the legitimation 
of law. Subsequently, I will consider Habermas’s modifications and 
additions to Weber’s theory of secularization.  
                                                                                                                    
 29. Berger, supra note 4, at 2.  
 30. Casanova, Rethinking Secularization, supra note 4, at 7. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. The third type of secularization (differentiation of secular spheres) may overlap to 
some extent with the second type in the sense that the “privatization of religion” is some-
times assumed to be a “normative condition” and a “precondition for modern liberal democ-
ratic politics.” Id. Given that Weber and Habermas focus on the third type without noting 
this potential overlap, I will not distinguish these two types but take them as related the-
ses supporting both descriptive and normative claims about the secularization of law.    
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A.   Weber’s Social Theory and Secularization 
 Habermas’s analysis of the modern problem of legitimizing law 
begins with Weber’s theory about the increasing rationalization of 
Western culture and law.34 Weber’s theory of rationalization includes 
a very elaborate typology of the different ideal types of rationality 
(e.g., subjective, objective, objectified, conceptual, instrumental, sub-
stantive, and formal) that he finds in Western culture.35 For the pur-
poses of this Article, it will serve to offer a general understanding of 
Weber’s theory (and Habermas’s modifications of it) and how it raises 
questions about the legitimation and application of law.36  
 According to Weber, Western culture is characterized by a “spe-
cific and peculiar rationalism”37 that has resulted in the “disen-
chantment of the world.”38 Before disenchantment, religious and 
metaphysical worldviews gave comprehensive explanations of the 
whole of life; life was not yet differentiated into spheres.39 Science, 
the only form of objective knowledge, then showed that religious and 
metaphysical worldviews could not provide an “objectively” rational 
explanation of the world.40 “Every increase of rationalism in empiri-
cal science,” Weber maintains, “increasingly pushe[d] religion from 
the rational into the irrational realm.”41 For Weber, science and sci-
entific (instrumental or means/end) rationality are normative be-
cause they comprise “the only possible form of a reasoned view of the 
world.”42 “For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who 
seek the truth.”43 Moreover, science discloses to us that the world 
process is a “meaningless infinity . . . on which human beings confer 
meaning and significance.”44 
                                                                                                                    
 34. Habermas’s attempt to build on Weber’s analysis of rationality and the rationali-
zation of society in his social theory makes sense because Habermas asserts that social 
theory is a theory of social action (social integration through human action) and that hu-
man action is based on reason (in the broad sense that humans act with self-understanding 
or consciousness).  
  35. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 292-301 (H. H. Gerth and C. 
W. Mills trans. & eds., 1958) [hereinafter WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER]. 
 36. For a more detailed treatment of Weber’s social theory and legal positivism, 
Habermas’s social theory and discourse theory of law (from which the discussions in Parts 
II and III are partially drawn), and a critique of the discourse of justification, see Modak-
Truran, supra note 23, at 464-82. 
 37. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 26 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., 1958) [hereinafter WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC]. 
 38. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 35, at 155, 350. 
 39. Id. at 154-55. 
 40. Id. at 350-51.  
 41. Id. at 351. 
 42. Id. at 355.  
 43. MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 84 (Edward A. Shils & 
Henry A. Finch trans. & eds., 1949) [hereinafter WEBER, METHODOLOGY]. 
 44. Id. at 81. 
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 Accordingly, Weber claims that modern individuals (who are pre-
sumed to embrace scientific rationality) are faced with the knowledge 
of an absolute division between objectively rational facts and subjec-
tively rational values.45 All values are subjective and are only subjec-
tively valid.46 Although objective scientific rationality can determine 
the technically correct means to a given end, it cannot determine the 
correct value-orientation.47 Weber maintains that “the choice between 
‘God’ and the ‘Devil’ ” and “every single important activity and ulti-
mately life as a whole . . . is a series of ultimate decisions through 
which the soul—as in Plato—chooses its own fate, i.e., the meaning 
of its activity and existence.”48 Value-orientations (traditional, affec-
tional, value-rational, and instrumental) are based on an irrational, 
arbitrary, and criterionless choice.49 “There is no (rational or empiri-
cal) scientific procedure of any kind whatsoever which can provide us 
with a decision here.”50 Science can make objectively rational judg-
ments for only a narrow range of technical problems where the end is 
precisely given and the only decision concerns choosing the most ra-
tional means.51 Consequently, scientific rationality, the most distinc-
tive type of rationality defining Western culture, cannot solve the 
most important individual and social problems concerning what ends 
or values to pursue.52 
 The “specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture” has fur-
ther resulted in the differentiation of society into numerous spheres 
of life or objectified forms of rationality including industrial capital-
ism, formalistic law, and bureaucratic administration.53 These objec-
tified forms of rationality have become embodied or institutionalized 
in the social order and confront individuals as something external. 
For example, the objectified rationality of industrial capitalism has 
“become an iron cage” or “an immense cosmos into which the individ-
                                                                                                                    
 45. Id. at 18-19, 52-53. 
 46. Id. at 51-53, 83. 
 47. Id. at 18-19, 34-35. 
 48. Id. at 18. 
 49. Id. at 18-19; WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 35, at 152.  
 50. WEBER, METHODOLOGY, supra note 43, at 19. 
 51. Id. at 18-19, 52-53. 
 52. For Habermas’s and other Frankfurt School thinkers’ critiques of instrumental 
reason, see 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND 
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 366-99 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter 1 
HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION].  
 53. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 37, at 26. Weber’s use of the term ob-
jective rationality is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as meaning both objectively correct 
action and as supra-individual or institutionalized rationality. Thus, I have used the term 
“objectified” to denote “objectivity” in the institutionalized sense. In addition, please note 
that Habermas refers to Weber’s “spheres of life” both as spheres, 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 244-71, and as “cultural subsystems.” Id. at 72. 
I will use the term “spheres of life” or “spheres” to promote continuity with the discussion 
of Weber. 
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ual is born, and which presents itself . . . as an unalterable order of 
things in which he must live.”54 One of the leading principles of capi-
talism, the Protestant Ethic, requires “the earning of more and more 
money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoy-
ment of life.”55 In the world of “economic survival of the fittest,” vio-
lating this principle results in being “eliminated from the economic 
scene.”56 Likewise, modern bureaucratic organization constitutes an  
“ ‘escape-proof’ ” “inanimate machine” that “is busy fabricating the 
shell of bondage which men will perhaps be forced to inhabit some 
day.”57 Moreover, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism, Weber observes that: 
[t]here is, for example, rationalization of mystical contemplation, 
that is of an attitude which, viewed from other departments of life, 
is specifically irrational, just as much as there are rationalizations 
of economic life, of technique, of scientific research, of military 
training, of law and administration. Furthermore, each one of 
these fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate 
values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may 
well be irrational from another. Hence rationalizations of the most 
varied character have existed in various departments of life and in 
all areas of culture. To characterize their differences . . . it is nec-
essary to know what departments are rationalized, and in what di-
rection.58 
Consequently, this passage emphasizes both the variety of differenti-
ated fields (i.e., “spheres of life”) that result from the rationalization 
of society and the multiplicity of historical processes of rationaliza-
tion (both internal and external to the spheres) that are proceeding 
at different rates and are furthering different ends and values.  
 The rationalization of Western culture has also affected the bases 
of legitimation within these differentiated “spheres of life” such as 
law. Weber recognizes four basic types of legitimation: (1) traditional; 
(2) affectual (emotional) faith; (3) value-rational (including ethical); 
and (4) legal (positive enactment).59 Rationalization, however, has 
minimized the first three types. “Today,” Weber claims, “the most 
common form of legitimacy is the belief in legality, the compliance 
with enactments which are formally correct and which have been 
made in the accustomed manner.”60 In other words, legality is that 
                                                                                                                    
 54. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 37, at 181, 54.  
 55. Id. at 53.   
 56. Id. at 55.   
 57. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1401, 1402 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wit-
tich eds., 1978) [hereinafter 2 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY]. 
 58. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 37, at 26.   
 59. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 36 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
1978). 
 60. Id. at 37. 
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which is produced from following the recognized procedures consti-
tuting positive enactment; no substantive criteria of justice must be 
met.  
 Legality, in this sense, constitutes legitimacy either because “it 
derives from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties” or be-
cause “it is imposed by an authority which is held to be legitimate 
and therefore meets with compliance.”61 The distinction between le-
gitimacy by voluntary agreement and by the imposition of authority 
is relative. For example, in majoritarian democracies, the majority 
often imposes its agreement on the dissenting minority.62 In addition, 
legality—whether democratically determined or not—can be reduced 
to compliance with the procedures believed to be legitimate in the ex-
isting regime.63 In a rationalized society, many spheres of life—
economic, bureaucratic, and legal—will be legitimized by legality be-
cause the other bases of legitimation, whether value-rational (moral, 
religious, metaphysical), traditional, or emotional, have been sub-
stantially diminished by the rationalization of society. Thus, once re-
ligious and metaphysical world views have been eliminated as a jus-
tification for law, law must have its own independent, rational justi-
fication. The law is autonomous.  
B.   Habermas’s Social Theory and Secularization 
 Habermas’s social theory incorporates much of Weber’s descrip-
tive analysis of the rationalization or secularization of Western soci-
ety.64 Habermas agrees that the world has been disenchanted of reli-
gious and metaphysical worldviews and that law, like other spheres, 
has been differentiated and requires its own rational justification or 
legitimation. Habermas adds to Weber’s analysis the “hypothesis 
that the socially integrative and expressive functions that were at 
first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action; 
the authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an 
achieved consensus.”65 Communicative action in effect takes the place 
of religious legitimation. “[B]asic normative agreement” resulting 
from rational arguments based on “criticizable validity claims” be-
comes the everyday mode of legitimation after disenchantment.66 In 
addition, Habermas adds the concept of lifeworld, which signals “the 
                                                                                                                    
 61. Id. at 36. 
 62. Id. at 37. 
 63. Jürgen Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN 
VALUES 219 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., Kenneth Baynes trans., 1988) [hereinafter 
Habermas, Law and Morality]. 
 64. See, e.g., 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 143-
271.  
 65. 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND 
SYSTEM 77 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987). 
 66. Id. 
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decentration of an egocentric understanding of the world.”67 Haber-
mas claims that in communicative action, “the members of a commu-
nication community demarcate the one objective world and their in-
tersubjectively shared social world from the subjective worlds of in-
dividuals and (other) collectives.”68 Thus, both the spheres, or cul-
tural subsystems, and the lifeworld are rationalized in modern life.  
 While accepting much of Weber’s description analysis, Habermas 
rejects Weber’s normative claims that instrumental (means/ends) ra-
tionality is the only “objective” rationality and that value-rationality 
is irrational. To the contrary, Habermas argues that morality can be 
rationally grounded,69 and that all “practical questions can be judged 
impartially and decided rationally.”70 This is one of Habermas’s big-
gest disagreements with Weber. He claims that 
Weber goes too far when he infers from the loss of the substantial 
unity of reason a polytheism of gods and demons [Glaubensmächte] 
struggling with one another, with their irreconcilability rooted in a 
pluralism of incompatible validity claims. The unity of rationality 
in the multiplicity of value spheres rationalized according to their 
inner logics is secured precisely at the formal level of the argumen-
tative redemption of validity claims.71 
Habermas further maintains that normative validity claims are dif-
ferent from empirical claims because they can be redeemed by argu-
ments. Arguments or reasons, for Habermas, gain “the force of ra-
tional motivation under the communicative conditions of a coopera-
tive testing of hypothetical validity claims.”72 This cooperative testing 
involves “differentiated validity claims—to propositional truth, nor-
mative rightness, sincerity and authenticity, as well as the claim to 
well-formedness or intelligibility related to symbolic construction in 
accordance with rules,” which “call not merely for reasoning in gen-
eral, but for reasons in a form of argumentation typical of each.” 73  
 In other words, the societal process of rationalization has differen-
tiated different spheres that function according to different validity 
claims, but it has not resulted in an “iron cage” or a reification of 
subsystems. Claims within these separate spheres and the values to 
which these spheres are directed (i.e., no loss of meaning) can still be 
validated. Communicative action coordinates action through a proc-
                                                                                                                    
 67. 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 69.  
 68. Id. at 70.  
 69. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION 43-115 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) [hereinafter 
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS]. 
 70. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 109. 
 71. 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 249. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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ess of reaching understanding and agreement among social actors. 
Coordinated action is not forced from the outside (a constriction on 
individual freedom) nor is it merely a de facto accord (strategic 
agreement to achieve individual successes). Rather, communicative 
action ensures the full release of human potential and maximizes in-
dividual freedom. Thus, when properly understood, the rationaliza-
tion or secularization of Western society will lead to the emancipa-
tion, rather than enslavement, of individuals as the rationalization of 
society increases, and intersubjective rationality and communicative 
action will provide a rational normative grounding for law, morality, 
and politics.74  
 Moreover, Habermas disagrees with Weber’s claim that law and 
morality are completely separate and argues that law and morality 
complement one another.75 While law cannot be reduced to a deficient 
morality, it requires the impartial moral point of view as part of the 
self-regulating procedure that checks its own rationality.76 “With the 
positivity of law the problem of justification did not disappear,” 
Habermas concludes, “it only shifted to the narrower basis of a post-
traditional, secular ethic, decoupled from metaphysical and religious 
worldviews.”77  
 In this respect, a central aspect of Habermas’s social theory aims 
to explain the separation of law, politics, and morality into different 
spheres of life and the implication of this secularization or differen-
tiation of law for legitimating the law. Once religious and metaphysi-
cal worldviews have been eliminated as a justification for law, law 
must be legitimated in a seemingly paradoxical manner—by its legal-
ity.78 The descriptive account of law provided by the sociology of law 
merely identifies legality with law’s facticity (e.g., law’s origination 
via positive enactment according to certain formal procedures). The 
normative account of law provided by the philosophy of justice identi-
fies legality as further requiring that law be rationally justified so 
that all citizens should find it acceptable.79 Habermas concludes that 
                                                                                                                    
 74. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 98. 
 75. See infra Part III.B. 
 76. Habermas, Law and Morality, supra note 63, at 274. 
 77. Id. at 268. 
 78. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 26-27. 
 79. Habermas maintains that all philosophical “attempts at discovering ultimate 
foundations,” either “ontological hopes for substantive theories of nature, history, society, 
and so forth” or “transcendental-philosophical hopes for an aprioristic reconstruction of the 
equipment of a nonempirical species subject, of consciousness in general. . . . have broken 
down.” 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 2. Rather, phi-
losophy now focuses on “the formal conditions of rationality in knowing, in reaching under-
standing through language, and in acting . . . . The theory of argumentation thereby takes 
on a special significance; to it falls the task of reconstructing the formal-pragmatic presup-
positions and conditions of an explicitly rational behavior.” Id. (emphasis added). Conse-
quently, understanding the substantive conditions of human existence (objective, social, 
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the secularization of law means both that “[t]he democratic proce-
dure for the production of law evidently forms the only postmeta-
physical source of legitimacy,” and that this democratic procedure 
must be rationally justified for it to bestow “legitimating force.”80  
III.   LEGALITY AS LEGITIMATION AND THE DISCOURSE OF 
JUSTIFICATION 
 While adopting most of Weber’s descriptive theory of the ration-
alization of society, Habermas’s discourse theory of law attempts to 
provide a substantially different and arguably noncircular interpre-
tation of the paradoxical emergence of legitimacy from legality. 
Habermas maintains that no one has thus far been able to provide an 
                                                                                                                    
and subjective worlds) becomes an empirical task of inductively arriving at the best social 
theory for explaining the current conditions of modern society. Together, the “formal expli-
cation of the conditions of rationality and empirical analysis of the embodiment and his-
torical development of rationality structures” will give us some insight into a new form of 
rationality which bases “the rationality of an expression on its being susceptible of criti-
cism and grounding.” Id. at 2, 9. To understand law properly requires both a formal expli-
cation of the conditions of legal validity (philosophy of justice) and an understanding of 
how the substantive conditions of modern society affect the distinctive character of modern 
legal systems (sociology of law). Thus, Habermas’s philosophy of justice and sociology of 
law together form a critical legal theory that can be used as a standard to evaluate modern 
legal systems. 
 80. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 448 (emphasis added). 
Habermas’s claims about the secularization of law appear to be both descriptive and nor-
mative. He is not always clear in the way he is using the term. For the purposes of my in-
ternal critique of the discourse theory of law, however, it is not necessary to sort out 
Habermas’s precise usage of the term in all cases. My critique puts into question both his 
descriptive and normative accounts of secularization. Although I will not attempt to un-
pack Habermas’s epistemological claims here, he seems to assume more than argue for his 
key distinction between communicative action as intersubjectively rational and religion as 
nonrational. Roman Catholic theologian David Tracy observes that Habermas “seems to 
ignore the validity claims of the religions in ways that even Kant, if not Weber, would have 
found puzzling.” David Tracy, Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm, in 
HABERMAS, MODERNITY, AND PUBLIC THEOLOGY 19, 35 (Don S. Browning & Francis 
Shüssler Fiorenza eds., 1992) [hereinafter HABERMAS, MODERNITY AND PUBLIC THEOLOGY]. 
Tracy suggests that Habermas assumes rather than argues “that no religious or theologi-
cal claims are argumentatively redeemable” in communicative action, which ignores that 
“modern theology (since Hegel and Schleiermacher) have demanded the same kind of criti-
cal reflection as other modern disciplines.” Id. For Habermas’s treatment of religion, see 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN NATURE 104-05 (2003) (recognizing some im-
portance for religion but arguing that the “neutral state” must remain “equal distance . . . 
from any strong traditions and comprehensive worldviews” and that “the sciences . . . hold 
the societal monopoly of secular knowledge.”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, RELIGION AND 
RATIONALITY: ESSAYS ON REASON, GOD, AND MODERNITY (Eduardo Mendieta ed., 2002) (fo-
cusing mainly on the relationship between philosophy and religion and the role of religion 
in a disenchanted world); Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. 
PHIL. 1, 5 (2006) (arguing that the “democratic procedure” must legitimate the state be-
cause of “the loss of legitimation caused by a secularization that deprives the state of deriv-
ing its authority from God”); Jürgen Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcen-
dence in this World, in HABERMAS, MODERNITY AND PUBLIC THEOLOGY, supra, at 226 (ar-
guing for methodological atheism in what appears to be his first and possibly last formal 
engagement with theologians). 
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adequate posttraditional or postreligious legitimation of modern law. 
Law cannot be reduced to morality (like some natural law theories) 
or political power (like Critical Legal Studies), but the legitimation of 
law is not, as Weber maintains, completely independent of politics 
and morality which complement law. In order to specify the relation-
ship between law, politics, and morality in Habermas’s discourse 
theory of law, this Part will briefly consider these alleged failures at 
posttraditional justification and compare them with the discourse of 
justification provided by Habermas’s discourse theory of law. The 
next Part will then summarize the discourse of application, which is 
the second component of the discourse theory of law, and its impor-
tant role in maintaining the independence of law from religion.  
A.   Legal Positivism and Legal Formalism 
 Given the consequences of secularization, Weber attempts to de-
fine legality merely in terms of procedural requirements. Weber pro-
poses a positivistic theory of law81 and claims that law can be legiti-
mated by its legality. Legality, as discussed above, merely means 
that a formal process of positively enacting law (via certain proce-
dures that are believed to be legitimate in the existing regime) was 
followed. No substantive criteria of justice must be met. Further, law 
cannot draw any legitimizing force from morality or from compre-
hensive religious or metaphysical worldviews.82 The rationalization of 
society and law has eliminated these traditional or value-rational 
bases of legitimation. Law possesses its own independent rationality; 
it is not reducible to morality or political power. “[L]aw is precisely 
what the political legislator—whether democratic or not—enacts as 
law in accordance with a legally institutionalized procedure.”83 Weber 
detaches law from moral-practical rationality and reduces law to that 
which was positively enacted according to the accepted procedures.84 
 In addition, Weber argues that the secularization or rationaliza-
tion of law finally leads to a formalistic system of law. In its ideal 
form, law becomes a “legal science,” which maximizes the calcula-
bility of social action by maximizing the use of instrumental rational-
                                                                                                                    
 81. In the legal context, positivism usually means that law is not legitimated by mo-
rality (rational normative justification) but is legitimated by following the established for-
mal procedures for enacting a law (facticity). In other words, the primary purpose of legal 
theory is descriptive rather than normative. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
240 (2d ed. 1989) (claiming in the new appendix to The Concept of Law that his “account is 
descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to 
justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in 
[his] general account of law”).   
 82. 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 259; Haber-
mas, Law and Morality, supra note 63, at 219 
 83. Habermas, Law and Morality, supra note 63, at 219. 
 84. 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 262. 
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ity. Legal science has “the highest measure of methodological and 
logical rationality” that Weber summarizes in the following five pos-
tulates:85  
(1) “[E]very concrete legal decision be the ‘application’ of an ab-
stract legal proposition to a concrete ‘fact situation’;”  
(2) “[I]t must be possible in every concrete case to derive the deci-
sion from abstract legal propositions by means of legal logic;”  
(3) “[T]he law must actually or virtually constitute a ‘gapless’ sys-
tem of legal propositions, or must, at least, be treated as if it were 
such a gapless system;”  
(4) “[W]hatever cannot be ‘construed’ rationally in legal terms is 
also legally irrelevant; and”  
(5) “[E]very social action of human beings must always be visual-
ized as either an ‘application’ or ‘execution’ of legal propositions, or 
as an ‘infringement’ thereof.”86 
 For Weber, the “ ‘gaplessness’ of the legal system” results “in a 
gapless ‘legal ordering’ of all social conduct” so that the law is sealed 
off from morality, politics, and religion.87 This “[j]uridical formalism 
enables the legal system to operate like a technically rational ma-
chine.”88 Mechanical accounts of jurisprudence like Weber’s are often 
referred to as strong legal formalism because they posit such a strong 
deductive character of judicial decisionmaking and a strong auton-
omy of law from politics, morality, and religion.89 Without this strong 
legal formalism, “the juristic precision of judicial opinions will be se-
riously impaired if sociological, economic, or ethical argument were 
to take the place of legal concepts.”90 Weber’s classic statement of 
secularization makes clear that the autonomy of law presupposes a 
strong legal formalism to prevent religious, moral, political, or other 
nonlegal arguments from compromising the autonomy of law during 
its application. Consequently, unlike most contemporary legal theo-
                                                                                                                    
 85. 2 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 57, at 657.  
 86. Id. at 657-58.  
 87. Id. at 658.  
 88. Id. at 811. 
 89. Similar to Weber, Christopher Columbus Langdell, who is often considered the 
archetype of strong legal formalism in the United States, considered law a science and 
claimed that “all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books.” A. 
SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 175 (1967). He argued that common law cases could 
be reduced to a formal system and that the judge, like a technician, could determine the 
right decision as a matter of deductive logic by pigeonholing cases into the formal system. 
In other words, strong legal formalism maintains that legal decisionmaking is essentially a 
deductive process whereby the application of legal rules results in determinative outcomes 
so that judicial decisionmaking is autonomous or separate from religion, morality, politics, 
etc. For further discussion of the dominance of strong legal formalism from the Civil War 
to World War I, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977).  
 90. 2 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 57, at 894. 
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rists, Weber understands that the secularization of law can only be 
sustained during the application of law by strong legal formalism.  
 Despite his reliance on Weber, Habermas rejects positivistic theo-
ries of law and strong legal formalism. For example, Habermas 
shows that Weber’s theory of legality as legitimacy is circular. Ac-
cording to Habermas, “[i]t remains unclear how the belief in legality 
is supposed to summon up the force of legitimation if legality means 
only conformity with an actually existing legal order, and if this or-
der, as arbitrarily enacted law, is not in turn open to practical-moral 
justification.”91 This belief in legality merely presupposes that the le-
gal order is legitimate. In other words, a belief that certain proce-
dures will produce valid laws does not make it so; “the belief in legal-
ity does not per se legitimize.”92 Those procedures must themselves be 
legitimized. Weber’s theory is fatally circular because he merely pre-
supposes or believes in their validity. Moreover, Habermas’s argu-
ment applies to other positivistic theories because they also define 
legality merely in terms of a set of existing formal procedures with-
out legitimizing those procedures.93 
 Weber’s strong legal formalism further contradicts Habermas’s 
claim that almost “all [legal] norms are inherently indeterminate.”94 
                                                                                                                    
 91. 1 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 265 (empha-
sis added). See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 97-99 (Thomas McCarthy 
trans., 1975) [hereinafter HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS]; David Ingram, The Subject of 
Justice in Postmodern Discourse: Aesthetic Judgement and Political Rationality, in 
HABERMAS AND THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 269, 275 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves & Seyla 
Benhabib eds., 1997) (arguing that “Habermas’s critical philosophy seeks to justify moder-
nity in the face of Weber’s paradoxes: the relativism of rational value spheres that ostensi-
bly gives rise to social pathology and the identification of social rationalization with capi-
talism”); John P. McCormick, Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas: The Sociology and Phi-
losophy of Law During Crises of the State, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 297, 311 (1997) (arguing 
that “the riddle of whether mere legality could entail legitimacy” left unresolved by We-
ber’s “thin notion of legal validity” is central to Habermas’s analysis of law).  
 92. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 202; HABERMAS, 
LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 91, at 99. Alternatively, Harold Berman criticizes We-
ber’s legal positivism for different reasons. He maintains that  
Weber’s . . . misunderstanding of religion . . . especially of sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism in 
Germany and England, respectively, was coupled with a misunder-
standing of the legal developments that took place in those countries 
during those centuries, and in both cases this was due to the fallacy of 
his sharp separation of fact from value and of his strict positivist view 
of law as fact alone and as primarily an instrument of political coercion. 
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 28 (2003). 
 93. See, e.g., HART, supra note 81, at 110, 101 (arguing that the rule of recognition is 
the criteria that determines the validity of laws in the legal system but “[i]ts existence is a 
matter of fact” so that “[f]or the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its exis-
tence is shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, either by courts or other 
officials or private persons or their advisors”). 
 94. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 217 
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Both the Legal Realists and the Critical Legal Studies Movement 
(CLS) substantiate Habermas’s claim by demonstrating the indeter-
minacy of the law that effectively undermines the feasibility of strong 
legal formalism. For example, legal realist Karl Llewellyn argues 
that “legal rules do not lay down any limits within which a judge 
moves.”95 CLS goes further by rejecting not only strong legal formal-
ism, but also any attempt to find a rational principle that can resolve 
legal indeterminacy. In this respect, Mark Kelman claims that “the 
legal system is invariably simultaneously philosophically committed 
to mirror-image contradictory norms, each of which dictates the op-
posite result in any case (no matter how ‘easy’ the case first ap-
pears).”96  
 Although there is little consensus about the nature and degree of 
legal indeterminacy,97 most legal theorists have come to accept that 
the law is indeterminate such that there are hard cases where the 
apparently relevant statutes, common law, contracts, or constitu-
tional law provisions at issue do not clearly resolve the dispute. For 
example, the indeterminacy of the United States Constitution results 
in many hard cases where judges arrive at conflicting decisions about 
the Constitution’s implications for abortion, physician-assisted sui-
cide, and same-sex marriage. Ken Kress has noted that “[t]he inde-
terminacy thesis asserts that law does not constrain judges suffi-
ciently, raising the specter that judicial decision making is often or 
always illegitimate.”98 Judges must rely on extralegal norms to re-
solve hard cases which can result in inconsistent treatment of like 
cases and allow judges to rely on their political, moral, and religious 
convictions. Consequently, the indeterminacy thesis puts into ques-
tion the notion of the autonomy or independence of law.  
 As will become more evident in Part IV, Habermas does not see 
the discourse of application as mechanical, but he rejects the conclu-
sion that recognizing legal indeterminacy puts into question the 
separation of law from politics, morality, and religion. To the con-
trary, the last Part demonstrates that Habermas’s discourse theory 
of law fails to preserve the independence of law from religion in the 
                                                                                                                    
 95. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM § 56, at 80 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Mi-
chael Ansaldi trans., 1989). 
 96. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1987). 
 97. For example, Ken Kress notes that 
versions of indeterminacy differ according to whether they claim that 
the court has complete discretion to achieve any outcome at all (execute 
the plaintiff who brings suit to quiet title to his cabin and surrounding 
property in the Rocky Mountains) or rather has a limited choice among 
a few options (hold for defendant or plaintiff within a limited range of 
monetary damages or other remedies), or some position in between.  
Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, 
THEORY, AND PRACTICE 200, 201 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). 
 98. Id. at 203. 
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face of legal indeterminacy. Moreover, it will show that giving up on 
the strong legal formalism posited by Weber requires forfeiting the 
secularization of the law (both descriptively and normatively) in 
ways not yet fathomed by contemporary legal theory.  
B.   Distinguishing Law from Politics and Morality 
 Habermas further criticizes theories of law that reduce law to 
politics or morality. Some posttraditional theories of law reject the 
possibility of a procedurally or substantively rational justification of 
law and reduce law to politics. In general, they argue that neither le-
gality nor morality can provide a rational legitimation for law; law 
cannot be rationally legitimated and is an assertion of political 
power. For example, CLS rejects the claims that law and morality 
can be based on an apolitical method or procedure of justification and 
that the legal system can be objectively defended as embodying an 
intelligible moral order.99 The legal order is merely the outcome of 
power struggles or practical compromises. Thus, they advocate “the 
purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine to ad-
vance leftist aims.”100 Similarly, feminist legal theorists usually claim 
that the dominant moral and legal doctrines reflect a male bias.101 In 
both cases, legality is not an independent form of legitimation, but an 
assertion of political power.102 As a result, law cannot be legitimized 
by its legality (or moral validity); law can merely be explained as the 
institutionalized biases of the empowered group (especially wealthy, 
white males).   
                                                                                                                    
 99. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 563 (1983) (the social and historical analyses of Marx and Weber have been particu-
larly influential on many critical legal theorists). For a good introduction to Critical Legal 
Studies, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987), and for a helpful 
assessment of Critical Legal Studies, see RICHARD W. BAUMAN, IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY 
IN THE FIRST WAVE OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (2002) [hereinafter BAUMAN, IDEOLOGY 
AND COMMUNITY]. See also Mark C. Modak-Truran, Book Review, Law & Politics Book Re-
view, Vol. 13, No. 10 (Oct. 2003), http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/ 
Bauman1003.htm (reviewing BAUMAN, IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY, supra). 
 100. Unger, supra note 99, at 567. 
 101. For an excellent introduction to feminist jurisprudence, see Robin West, Juris-
prudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 
201 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991). Note that West discusses a dif-
ferent “separation thesis” which claims that human beings are essentially separate (typical 
of masculine or modern jurisprudence), rather than essentially connected (typical of femi-
nist jurisprudence), to other human beings and not that law and morality are separate. Id. 
at 2. 
 102. In this context, political refers to the modern notion that politics is a matter of 
promoting self- or group-interest. One is presumed to know one’s interest, and politics is 
merely a means to attaining your goal (i.e. instrumental rationality (means/ends)). By con-
trast, politics in the classic sense is about determining and fostering the common good (the 
good life). 
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 Conversely, Habermas rejects any attempt to reduce law to poli-
tics. He claims that the very nature of political power would be un-
dermined; political power could no longer function as legal authority. 
“As soon as legitimation is presented as the exclusive achievement of 
politics, we have to abandon our concepts of law and politics.”103 For 
Habermas, the rationalization of society has eliminated religious and 
metaphysical worldviews as bases of legitimation, but rather than 
reducing law and morality to politics, it has simultaneously led to the 
differentiation of the spheres of law, morality, and politics. Contrary 
to Weber, CLS, and some feminists, he claims that politics is a mat-
ter of practical reason in the modified classic sense that we can come 
to a rational intersubjective agreement about the norms required for 
establishing a just society (i.e., communicative reason replaces prac-
tical reason).104 All “practical questions can be judged impartially and 
decided rationally,”105 including law, morality, and politics. Further, 
“[w]ithout the backing of religious or metaphysical worldviews that 
are immune to criticism, practical orientations can in the final analy-
sis be gained only from rational discourse, that is, from the reflexive 
forms of communicative action itself.”106 In the communicative action 
of democratic law formation, politics is a part of law in the sense that 
the ethical-political reasons influence the rational agreement consti-
tuting its formulation. However, moral and pragmatic reasons also 
influence that agreement.107 As a result, law cannot be reduced to 
politics,108 and the validity of law cannot be derived from its positivity 
or from politics and religion.  
                                                                                                                    
 103. Habermas, Law and Morality, supra note 63, at 267. 
 104. Habermas has recently characterized one of the aspects of the theory of communi-
cative action as a “[r]ecasting [of] the basic concepts of ‘practical reason’ in terms of a 
‘communicative rationality.’ ” HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 9. 
He claims that the classical understanding of practical reason is based on a “philosophical 
foundation in the knowing [individual] subject” (subject/object model of consciousness), in-
volves only normative validity claims (rightness), and has a moral telos (a subjective capac-
ity to tell actors what they ought to do). Id. at 3, 4. By contrast, communicative reason is 
based on a decentration of the subject into objective, subjective, and social worlds. This 
means that reasoning is a communal rather than an individual process. In addition, every 
speech act in communicative action involves three distinct validity claims which corre-
spond to the three world relations: a truth claim (objective world of states of affairs), a 
rightness claim (social world of normatively regulated interpersonal relations), and a 
truthfulness or sincerity claim (subjective world of individual experiences). Id. at 3-5. Fi-
nally, the moral telos of practical reason which aims at immediate prescriptions is replaced 
by a linguistic telos which aims at mutual understanding and consensus. Id. at 4. 
 105. Id. at 109. 
 106. Id. at 98. 
 107. For Habermas’s distinction between ethical-political, moral, and pragmatic rea-
sons and their role in democratic law formation, see supra text accompanying notes 87-90. 
 108. Note, however, that Habermas’s argument is pragmatic rather than foundational. 
He claims that his social theory better explains our use of the terms law and politics rather 
than giving a foundational justification of his definition of politics as rational. Habermas, 
Law and Morality, supra note 63, at 267. 
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 In addition, law cannot be reduced to morality. Habermas argues 
that the reduction of law to morality results “not only from certain 
premises rooted in the philosophy of consciousness but also from a 
metaphysical legacy inherited from natural law, namely, the subor-
dination of positive law to natural or moral law.”109 As discussed in 
Part III.C, law as subordinate to morality is a premodern idea of law 
that eliminates the instrumental aspects of law (ethical-political and 
pragmatic) and undermines the complementary relationship between 
law and morality. Despite this complementary relationship, law is a 
separate sphere which is evident from the different functions that 
law and morality play in society. In this respect, Habermas claims 
that “morality and law differ prima facie inasmuch as posttraditional 
morality represents only a form of cultural knowledge, whereas law 
has, in addition to this, a binding character at the institutional level. 
Law is not only a symbolic system but an action system as well.”110 
Moreover, law is related to, but distinct from, politics and morality, 
and, thus, it requires a different basis of, or reasons for, legitimation.  
C.   The Discourse Theory of Law and the Legitimation of Law 
 Once the religious and metaphysical worldviews have been elimi-
nated, “the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative 
arrangement: as participants in rational discourses, consociates un-
der law must be able to examine whether a contested norm meets 
with, or could meet with, the agreement of all those possibly af-
fected.”111 Here we see that the consensus formerly based on tradition 
and settled ethical conventions is being replaced by rational inter-
subjective consensus. This signals a rationalization of the modern 
lifeworld into the subjective, objective, and intersubjective (neglected 
by Weber) in addition to a rationalization and differentiation of the 
spheres of life.112 “From the vantage point of the theory of communi-
cative action, we can say that the subsystem ‘law,’ as a legitimate or-
der that has become reflexive, belongs to the societal component of 
the lifeworld.”113 Under these conditions, the real basis of legitima-
tion, rational agreement, becomes evident and heightens “the need 
for legitimating enacted law—a law that rests on the changeable de-
cisions of a political legislator.”114 The secularization or disenchant-
ment of the world eliminated the possibility of an “objective” legiti-
mation of law. Assuming rationality still has some nonsubjective 
                                                                                                                    
 109. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 84. 
 110. Id. at 107. Cf. Habermas, Law and Morality, supra note 63, at 220. 
 111. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 104. See also 1 
HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 52, at 261. 
 112. Id. at 340. 
 113. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 80. 
 114. Id. at 95. 
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meaning, intersubjective agreement must then become the arbiter of 
legitimation. Legitimation thus occurs from the procedure of coming 
to a rational intersubjective agreement. The substance of legitimate 
law is not known ahead of time. The important issue for legitimation 
becomes the rationality of the procedures required to produce a ra-
tional intersubjective agreement. Consequently, an answer to the 
question of what makes a law valid depends on a procedural, inter-
subjective process of validation that is internal to law. 
 Habermas has proposed the discourse principle as such a proce-
dure. He has recently pointed out that in his prior writing on dis-
course ethics he has failed to sufficiently distinguish the moral prin-
ciple from the discourse principle.115 The discourse principle is the 
more general principle and “is only intended to explain the point of 
view from which norms of action can be impartially justified.”116 It 
specifies the conditions under which rational agreement must occur 
to produce legitimate (intersubjectively rational or impartial) action 
norms (the practical norms of law, morality, and politics).117 Haber-
mas summarizes this new procedural criterion of validity: “Just those 
action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses.”118 He defines “action 
norms” “as temporally, socially, and substantively generalized behav-
ior expectations.”119 “Affected” persons include those whose interests 
could be foreseeably touched by the consequences of the action 
norm.120 Finally, he defines “rational discourse” as any attempt at 
                                                                                                                    
 115. Id. at 108. 
 116. Id. at 108-09. 
 117. Habermas recognizes that the discourse principle “presupposes that practical 
questions can be judged impartially and decided rationally.” Id. at 109. But he claims to 
pragmatically redeem this claim by showing that “[w]henever we want to convince one an-
other of something, we always already intuitively rely on a practice in which we presume 
that we sufficiently approximate the ideal conditions of a speech situation specially immu-
nized against repression and inequality.” Id. at 228. Thus, an attempt to deny the general 
pragmatic presuppositions of the ideal speech condition results in a performative contra-
diction because one accepts its presuppositions in one’s attempt to deny them. See also 
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 69, at 197-98. In Moral Consciousness, 
Habermas argues: 
the thesis that discourse ethics puts forth on this subject [the universal 
validity of moral norms] is that anyone who seriously undertakes to 
participate in argumentation implicitly accepts by that very undertak-
ing general pragmatic presuppositions that have a normative content. 
The moral principle can then be derived from the content of these pre-
suppositions of argumentation if one knows at least what it means to 
justify a norm of action. 
Id. 
 118. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 107. Cf. HABERMAS, 
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 69, at 66 (summarizing the discourse principle in dis-
course ethics: “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.”). 
 119. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 107. 
 120.  Id. 
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understanding that occurs under conditions of communication pro-
viding for free processing of information and reasons.121 Alterna-
tively, Habermas talks about a norm lying “equally in the interest of 
everyone.”122 That norm would be rationally acceptable to all because 
“all those possibly affected should be able to accept the norm on the 
basis of good reasons. But this can become clear only under the 
pragmatic conditions of rational discourses in which the only thing 
that counts is the compelling force of the better argument based on 
the relevant information.”123  
 In the case of morality and law, each of these spheres separately 
utilizes the discourse principle as a procedure for validating moral 
(via moral principle) and legal (via principle of democracy) claims. 
Both the moral principle and the principle of democracy are specifi-
cations of the discourse principle. The moral principle justifies moral 
norms by the universalization principle, which gives equal considera-
tion to everyone’s interest.124 “[H]umanity or a presupposed republic 
of world citizens” is the frame of reference for grounding norms, and 
the decisive reasons for those norms must be persuasive to every-
one.125  
 Although the discourse theory of law is modeled after discourse 
ethics, “the heuristic priority of moral-practical discourses, and even 
the requirement that legal rules may not contradict moral norms, 
does not immediately imply that legal discourses should be conceived 
as a subset of moral argumentation.”126 Rather, the principle of de-
mocracy justifies legal norms on the basis of pragmatic, ethical-
political, and moral reasons—but not on the basis of moral reasons 
alone.127 The discourse must take into account ethical-political rea-
sons to provide the form of life of “our” political community for 
grounding norms. Legal norms express an authentic collective self-
understanding and must be acceptable in principle to all sharing 
“our” traditions and strong evaluations. In addition, pragmatic rea-
sons are those attempting to achieve “a rational balancing of compet-
                                                                                                                    
 121. Id. at 107-08. 
 122. Id. at 103. 
 123. Id. Cf. HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 69, at 43-115. 
 124. See also id. at 65 (summarizing the principle of universalization with respect to 
his discourse ethics: “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its gen-
eral observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and 
these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regula-
tion).”).  
 125. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 108. 
 126. Id. at 230. 
 127. Id. at 108. Habermas further emphasizes that “[w]hereas the democratic principle 
is applied only to norms that display the formal properties of legal norms, the moral prin-
ciple—according to which valid norms are in the equal interest of all persons—signifies a 
restriction to the kind of discourse in which only moral reasons are decisive.” Id. at 460 
(footnote omitted).   
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ing value orientations and interest positions.”128 The frame of refer-
ence here strives to take into account “the totality of social or subcul-
tural groups that are directly involved” for negotiating compro-
mises.129 Moreover, while moral reasons provide the impartial point 
of view in legal decisionmaking, ethical-political reasons make those 
reasons relevant to the historical situation, and pragmatic reasons 
help facilitate a compromise between competing positions.  
 The discourse of justification thus has both noninstrumental 
(moral) aspects and instrumental (ethical-political and pragmatic) 
aspects that inform the intersubjectively rational justification of law. 
Habermas argues that this kind of validity is the only feasible man-
ner of justifying laws given the facticity of the rationalization of soci-
ety and the lifeworld. As a result, the discourse of justification is 
Habermas’s attempt to reconcile facticity (the descriptive account of 
law) and validity (the normative account of law) at the level of justifi-
cation given the secularization of the law.  
IV.   THE DISCOURSE OF APPLICATION 
 Habermas argues that the discourse of application also has to rec-
oncile the tension between facticity and validity.130 In general, he 
claims that there is a tension between guaranteeing certainty or pre-
dictability with respect to the enforcement of law (facticity) and the 
legitimacy of making and applying the law (validity).131 The validity 
of law has two interdependent dimensions. The prior Part focused on 
the validity of making law via the discourse of justification and the 
principle of democracy, while this Part focuses on the validity of ap-
plying law via the discourse of application and the principle of ap-
propriateness. The validity of the application of law requires that the 
laws to be applied have been properly validated at the level of justifi-
cation. The discourse of application then determines which of the jus-
tified norms is appropriate to resolve the dispute without reopening 
the discourse of justification.  
 With respect to the application of the law, hard cases test a legal 
theory’s ability to provide an account of validity that maintains the 
independence of law from morality, politics, and religion (i.e., the 
secularization of the law). Applying the law in hard cases raises what 
Habermas refers to as the “rationality problem”: “how can the appli-
cation of a contingently emergent law be carried out with both inter-
nal consistency and rational external justification, so as to guarantee 
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 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 9-17. 
 131. Id. at 25-28. 
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simultaneously the certainty of law and its rightness?”132 In order for 
the discourse theory of law to succeed, Habermas must show that 
certainty and rightness can be redeemed at the level of judicial deci-
sionmaking despite legal indeterminacy. This Part will focus on 
Habermas’s attempt to solve the rationality problem with the dis-
course of application while the next Part will argue that the dis-
course of application is incoherent and fails to maintain the seculari-
zation of the law.  
A.   Problematic Aspects of Contemporary Legal Theory 
 Habermas argues that most other legal theories have failed to 
provide a compelling answer to the rationality problem.133 Several le-
gal theories, including natural law theory, legal positivism, legal re-
alism, and CLS run into problems as theories of application.134 This 
occurs, in part, because they fail to provide for the validity of law at 
the level of rational justification.135 Recall Habermas’s claim that 
natural law theory is not viable because it fails to differentiate law 
from morality, which runs contrary to the rationalization or seculari-
zation of society into separate spheres with their own rational justifi-
cation.136 Further, CLS and legal realism fail to separate law and 
politics at the level of justification, and legal positivism cannot vali-
date its own procedural norms that supposedly validate the law. Le-
gal positivism, legal realism, and CLS also provided accounts of the 
application of law that undermine the certainty and validity of law at 
the level of application.  
 Despite the differences among these theories, Habermas criticizes 
all of them for concluding that legal indeterminacy results in judges 
having the discretion or leeway to decide cases based on extralegal 
norms.137 For example, CLS claims that “[j]udges select principles 
and policies and construct their own legal theories from these in or-
der to ‘rationalize’ decisions, that is, to conceal the prejudices with 
which they compensate for the objective indeterminacy of law.”138 
Rather than relying on legal rules and principles intersubjectively 
validated via the discourse of justification, judges rely on their own 
political policies and ideologies to decide cases. While recognizing 
that almost “all [legal] norms are inherently indeterminate,”139 
Habermas claims that relying on extralegal norms undermines legal 
                                                                                                                    
 132. Id. at 199. 
 133. Id. at 199-203. 
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 135. See supra text accompanying notes 90-109. 
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validity at the level of application. By relying on extralegal norms, 
judges do not rely on impartially validated legal norms to decide 
cases, but on personal moral, political, or religious convictions. For 
Habermas, judges should not cross the “ ‘red line’ that marks the di-
vision of powers between courts and legislation” because this threat-
ens “democratic legitimacy.”140 Rather, “the legal discourse of the 
judge should be confined to the set of reasons that legislators either 
in fact put forward or at least could have mobilized for the parlia-
mentary justification of that norm.”141 Habermas thus attempts to 
temper his embrace of legal indeterminacy with a weak legal formal-
ism that provides some normative constraints on what counts as a 
valid reason for a judge’s decision. 
 Finally, although accepting the insight of legal hermeneutics that 
norms are not self-interpreting, Habermas also rejects its proposed 
solution to the rationality problem. Legal hermeneutics argues that 
judges have a preunderstanding that is shaped by a shared ethical 
tradition and that provides a way of steering “the flexible connections 
between norms and states of affairs in the light of received, and his-
torically corroborated, principles.”142 For Habermas, this method of 
application is not valid because it cannot be impartial.143 Recall that 
the principle of democracy justifies legal norms according to moral, 
ethical-political, and pragmatic norms.144 Even though the ethical-
political norms conform the law to our form of political community, 
law achieves its impartiality from moral norms that are intersubjec-
tively validated. As a result, legal hermeneutics fails because the 
judge’s application of the law depends on a preunderstanding that is 
ethical and historically relative rather than moral and impartial.  
B.   Helpful Aspects of Contemporary Legal Theory 
 By contrast, Habermas argues that Dworkin’s interpretative the-
ory of law helps solve the rationality problem and the supposed inde-
terminacy problem. Habermas claims that Dworkin’s theory is espe-
cially helpful for explaining how certainty and validity can be main-
tained even in hard cases where legal rules conflict. To provide a 
fuller understanding of the importance of Dworkin’s theory to the 
discourse theory of law, this Part will discuss Dworkin’s theory in 
more detail than Habermas does in Between Facts and Norms before 
it discusses Habermas’s appropriation of it.  
                                                                                                                    
 140. Jürgen Habermas, A Short Reply, 12 RATIO JURIS 445, 447 (1999). 
 141. Id. 
 142. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 200. 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 103-28. 
 144. Id. 
100  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:73 
 
 In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin differentiates rules, which 
“are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion,” from principles, which 
are merely “reason[s] that argue[] in one direction, but do[] not ne-
cessitate a particular decision.”145 If the facts of a case meet the facts 
a valid rule stipulates, the rule provides a determinate answer. How-
ever, if two rules provide contrary outcomes for the same dispute, 
then a coherent legal system must eliminate this conflict. Dworkin’s 
critical hermeneutics advocates relying on higher-level legal princi-
ples that are part of the history of legal interpretation rather than on 
the judge’s relative preunderstandings advocated by legal hermeneu-
tics. More than one principle may compete to resolve this dispute, 
and the principles may pull in opposite directions. To determine 
which principle applies, Dworkin claims in Law’s Empire that judges 
must try “to find, in some coherent set of principles about people’s 
rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the political 
structure and legal doctrine of their community.”146 The best con-
struction includes “convictions about both fit and justification.”147 The 
judge must construct the best interpretation that fits the prior legal 
materials and that achieves the best result in light of political moral 
principles specifying people’s rights and duties in the legal system. 
The interpretation that achieves “the best constructive interpretation 
of the community’s legal practice” is thus the “right answer” in that 
case.148  
 Dworkin further claims that “in a modern, developed, and com-
plex [legal] system” a tie with respect to fit would be “so rare as to be 
exotic.”149 This does not mean that lawyers will not disagree on which 
theory provides a better fit, but that “[i]t will be rare . . . that many 
lawyers will agree that neither provides a better fit than the 
other.”150 However, with respect to the dimension of political moral-
ity, he claims that “if two justifications provide an equally good fit 
with the legal materials, one nevertheless provides a better justifica-
tion than the other if it is superior as a matter of political or moral 
theory; if, that is, it comes closer to capturing the rights that people 
in fact have.”151 He argues that the second dimension makes it less 
likely that there is no right answer because he does not think it is 
likely for there to be a tie between two different theories of equal re-
spect. Moreover, he argues that “[t]here seems to be no room here for 
the ordinary idea of a tie. If there is no right answer in a hard case, 
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this must be in virtue of some more problematic type of indetermi-
nacy or incommensurability in moral theory.”152 In the final analysis, 
Dworkin’s interpretative theory of law constitutes a weak legal for-
malism which maintains that the law has adequate resources to 
come to determinate results in all cases.153 
 Habermas proposes a critical hermeneutical process of norm ap-
plication that incorporates Dworkin’s appeal to legal principles as a 
solution to the rationality problem and legal indeterminacy. Except 
for the application-specific legal norms which Dworkin calls rules, 
Habermas claims that “all [legal] norms are inherently indetermi-
nate.”154 However, “[i]f one assumes that the cases typical for pre-
sent-day adjudication involve not only application-specific rules but 
principles as well, then one can easily show why collisions are quite 
probable—and yet do not betray a deeper-lying incoherence in the le-
gal system itself.”155 Rather, these norms require additional specifica-
tions in individual cases. These norms are “only prima facie candi-
dates for application,” and different norms may lead to different re-
sults.156 The judge must determine which norm is the single appro-
priate norm and reconstruct a coherent system of legal norms that 
best accounts for this application. Following Dworkin, Habermas 
could be read to propose a weak legal formalism to explain how 
judges can determine the single appropriate norm without relying on 
any extralegal norms (even in hard cases).157 
 Protagonists of CLS, however, have claimed that the conflict 
among principles within the law means that “every attempt at a ra-
tional reconstruction is doomed to failure.”158 Habermas draws on 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Id. at 144. 
 153. Brian Leiter similarly describes Dworkin as a “sophisticated formalist . . . who has 
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McCormick, supra note 91, at 324 (characterizing Dworkin, Raz, and Rawls as embracing a 
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 154. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 217. 
 155. Id. 
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 157. As indicated below, Habermas’s discourse theory of law seems to presuppose a 
conception of law similar to Freidrich Karl von Savigny’s German historical school of juris-
prudence. See infra note 181. Like Habermas, von Savigny embraced legal formalism. 
Richard Posner notes that von Savigny proposed “that the German states (he was writing 
long before Germany became a nation in 1871) adopt the law of ancient Rome as the law of 
Germany—a highly formalistic version of Roman law, moreover.” Richard A. Posner, Reply: 
The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 952, 958 (2003). Posner further argues “that Savigny’s formalism was right for his 
time and place, where the urgent need (as in developing societies today) was for clear, uni-
form rules that could be applied mechanistically.” Id. at 958-59. 
 158. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 216. 
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Klaus Günther’s theory of legal argumentation to respond to this ob-
jection.159 Günther adds to the normative concept of coherence the 
distinction between discourses of justification and application and 
conceives of legal application as a special case of moral discourses of 
application.160 Although Habermas emphasizes that legal and moral 
norms and their discourses of justification differ, he agrees with 
Günther that the logic of applying moral and legal norms is the 
same.161 Habermas further claims that the differentiation of the dis-
courses of justification and application adds precision to Dworkin’s 
claim that conflicts among principles do not threaten the validity of 
law.  
 As noted above, the discourse of justification or legitimation relies 
on the principle of democracy,162 while the discourse of application 
utilizes the principle of appropriateness. Both discourses are re-
quired for impartial judgment. The discourse of justification justifies 
legal norms by an intersubjective agreement by all those possibly af-
fected. These norms are then prima facie candidates for application. 
That a norm is a prima facie candidate or “prima facie valid means 
merely that it has been impartially justified; only its impartial appli-
cation leads to a valid decision about a case.”163 The discourse of ap-
plication then determines which of those prima facie norms is most 
appropriate for the particular case via the principle of appropriate-
ness.  
 Separating the discourses of justification and application helps 
clarify that the process of deciding which of the conflicting norms is 
appropriate does not invalidate the norms that are not applied in the 
case. In other words, applying norms does not reopen the question of 
a norm’s validity. Validity of the norm is determined in the discourse 
of justification, not in the discourse of application. This relieves the 
discourse of application from the question of justification. Conse-
quently, if one infers from the collision of norms that the system of 
norms is incoherent, then “one would be confusing the norm’s ‘valid-
ity,’ which it enjoys in general insofar as it is justified, with its ‘ap-
propriateness’ for application in particular cases.”164 
 To determine which valid legal norm is most appropriate in a par-
ticular case, Habermas contends that “one must first enter a dis-
course of application to test whether they apply to a given situation 
(whose details could not have been anticipated in the justification 
process) or whether, their validity notwithstanding, they must give 
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way to another norm, namely, the ‘appropriate’ one.”165 This process 
simultaneously involves “weaving together a description of the cir-
cumstances and a concretization of general norms.”166 Applying a 
norm requires selecting only specific features of the particular case. 
Habermas clarifies that: 
the application discourse must determine which descriptions of the 
facts are significant and exhaustive for interpreting the situation 
in a disputed case; it must also determine which of the prima facie 
valid norms is the appropriate one once all the significant features 
of the situation have been apprehended as fully as possible . . . .167  
 In addition, Habermas claims that the conflicting norms are 
“prima facie candidates for application” so that the choice of one 
norm as appropriate just means that the other norms do not apply, 
rather than that the other norms are invalid.168 The case of a “conflict 
between norms” is a situation where the conflicting norms only ap-
parently conflict, because more than one norm appears prima facie 
valid. Although these prima facie valid norms are candidates for ap-
plication, one norm always proves to be the most appropriate one for 
the situation.169 The judge then constructs all these norms into a co-
herent system of legal norms. In commenting on the analogous proc-
ess of applying moral norms, Habermas claims that “[f]rom the 
standpoint of coherence, the relations within this order shift with 
each new case that leads to the selection of the ‘single appropriate 
norm.’ ”170 The selection of the “single appropriate norm” for a par-
ticular situation is what first confers “the determinate shape of a co-
herent order on the unordered mass of valid norms.”171 No new norms 
are generated to fit the context. Although the coherence among the 
norms shifts, the answer to the legal issue is derived for the existing 
norms. The judge is not an interstitial legislator creating new legal 
norms from extralegal norms. Rather, she searches for the appropri-
ate norm in the system of legal norms and reconstructs that system 
to make it the best she can in light of her application of the appropri-
ate norm. Thus, Habermas’s discourse theory of law recognizes a 
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“in principle a rationally motivated agreement must always be reachable, where the 
phrase ‘in principle’ signifies the counterfactual reservation ‘if argumentation were con-
ducted openly and continued long enough.’ ” HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra 
note 69, at 105.  
 170. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE 
ETHICS 38 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 1993) [hereinafter HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND 
APPLICATION]. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 148, at 112-13 (clarifying that principles are inter-
preted in relation to one another such as equal liberties rather than as mutually exclusive).  
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complete independence between judicial decisionmaking and the 
judges’ personal convictions whether they are comprehensive, politi-
cal, moral, etc.  
C.   Habermas’s Legal Paradigms as a Solution to Legal 
Indeterminacy 
 Despite his reliance on Dworkin and Günther, Habermas claims 
that “this coherence theory of law can avoid the indeterminancy sup-
posedly due to the contradictory structure of the legal system only at 
the cost of the theory itself becoming somehow indeterminate.”172 
Habermas argues that this indeterminancy results from what has 
been referred to as the “ripple effect argument.”173 The ripple effect 
argument notes that coherency theories require a reconstruction of 
the system of legal norms in every hard case. This results in a con-
tinuous reconfiguration of the system of legal norms and amounts to 
a retroactive interpretation of existing law. Each hard case requiring 
the determination of the single appropriate norm thus creates a rip-
ple in the coherent system of legal norms and makes the system in-
determinate.  
 In addition, the process of rational reconstruction places unrea-
sonable demands on judges and overtaxes the process of adjudica-
tion. Habermas contends that the complexity and uncertainty “of this 
task [are] reduced by the paradigmatic legal understanding prevail-
ing at the time.”174 Judges can rely on this paradigmatic legal under-
standing to help determine which principle is appropriate without 
reconstructing the whole system of legal norms. Habermas embraces 
Friedrich Kubler’s characterization of the legal paradigm as playing 
a guiding role for judicial decisionmaking: “ ‘it determines how the 
law is understood and construed; it stipulates which places, in which 
direction, and to what extent statutory law . . . is to be supplemented 
and modified by doctrinal commentary and judge-made law . . . ; and 
this means: it bears part of the responsibility for the future of social 
existence.’ ”175 
 Habermas asserts that there are only three legal paradigms cur-
rently in contention to play this guiding role in judicial decisionmak-
ing.176 He identifies the formal liberal paradigm, the materialist so-
cial welfare paradigm, and the proceduralist paradigm. The liberal 
paradigm envisions society as “tailored for the autonomy of legal sub-
                                                                                                                    
 172. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 219. 
 173. Id. (citing Ken Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights 
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jects who, primarily as market participants, would seek and find 
their happiness by pursuing their own particular interests as ration-
ally as possible.”177 As a reaction to the failures of this formalistic 
system of negative rights, the social welfare paradigm proposed a 
material conception of positive rights that granted individuals enti-
tlements to promote social equality in an unequal society. This intro-
duced “a new category of basic rights grounding claims to a more just 
distribution of social wealth (and a more effective protection from so-
cially produced dangers).”178 
 Despite the continued presence of the liberal and social welfare 
paradigms, Habermas claims that the current legal paradigm should 
be understood as proceduralist.179 This proceduralist paradigm has 
arisen from the contest between the liberal and social welfare para-
digms and their failure to achieve a proper relationship between pri-
vate and public autonomy. He further identifies the dispute over le-
gal paradigms as “essentially a political dispute” that should not be 
decided by the legal elite.180 Habermas claims that “[t]he paradig-
matic preunderstanding of law in general can limit the indetermi-
nancy of theoretically informed decision making and guarantee a suf-
ficient measure of legal certainty only if it is intersubjectively shared 
by all citizens and expresses a self-understanding of the legal com-
munity as a whole.”181 Although there seems to be an empirical com-
ponent to identifying the legal paradigms in contention (facticity), 
the legal paradigm that is to be shared by all citizens should be vali-
dated according to the proceduralist paradigm. Unlike the liberal and 
social welfare paradigms, the proceduralist paradigm no longer fa-
vors a particular ideal of society, a particular vision of the good life, 
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or even a particular political option. It is formal in the sense that it 
merely states the necessary conditions under which legal subjects in 
their role of enfranchised citizens can reach an understanding with 
one another about what their problems are and how they are to be 
solved.182 The proceduralist paradigm allows not only for the revision 
of the conditions it prescribes for subjects to reach understanding, 
but also for the reexamination of the paradigm itself when any per-
ceived change in the social context seems to warrant this.183 Conse-
quently, this allows all participants, not just legal experts, to partici-
pate in determining and continually reevaluating the validity of the 
legal paradigm for society.  
 Finally, contrary to Dworkin’s monological conception of judicial 
decisionmaking, Habermas claims that even the discourse of applica-
tion in judicial decisionmaking can be dialogical.184 Although the dis-
course of application is not a discourse in the literal sense, Habermas 
argues that through a process of idealization, the ideal speech condi-
tions can be approached in the discourse of application. First, he 
notes that “[p]articipants in an application discourse must work their 
different interpretations of the same situation into a normatively 
rich description of the circumstances that does not simply abstract 
from the existing differences in perception.”185 This preserves a link 
between the universal-perspective structure of the discourse of justi-
fication and the party-centered structure of these interpretations.  
 In addition, Habermas points out that  
interpretations of the individual case, which are formed in 
the light of a coherent system of norms, depend on the com-
municative form of a discourse whose socio-ontological con-
stitution allows the perspectives of the participants and the 
perspectives of uninvolved members of the community (rep-
resented by an impartial judge) to be transformed into one 
another.186  
He further argues that the rules of procedure help institutionally 
carve out a space so that there is a free exchange of arguments. At 
the same time, however, he recognizes that the actual conditions of a 
trial “seemingly prohibit one from using standards of rational dis-
course to assess courtroom proceedings in any way.”187 For instance, 
the parties strategically pursue their own interests rather than coop-
eratively seeking the truth. Despite the adversarial nature of this 
discourse, Habermas claims “that each participant in a trial, what-
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ever her motives, contributes to a discourse that from the judge’s per-
spective facilitates the search for an impartial judgment.”188 More-
over, he concludes that the “[r]ules of court procedure institutionalize 
judicial decision making in such a way that the judgment and its jus-
tification can be considered the outcome of an argumentation game 
governed by a special program.”189 
V.   CRITICAL COMMENTS 
 The complexity and sheer volume of Habermas’s work makes one 
question whether one has understood his project even after substan-
tial effort. Nevertheless, his theory of communicative action and dis-
course theory of law leave many unanswered questions and invite 
many critical responses. Although I maintain that both the discourse 
of justification190 and the discourse of application fail to support the 
autonomy of the law, my comments in this Part will demonstrate 
that Habermas’s discourse of application fails to provide a coherent 
account of judicial decisionmaking. As a result, Habermas’s discourse 
theory of law fails to provide a rational justification for the law that 
is independent of religious or comprehensive convictions.  
 First, despite Habermas’s attempts to characterize judicial deci-
sionmaking as a discourse of application, judicial decisionmaking ap-
pears to be the polar opposite of the type of rational intersubjective 
agreements he claims are necessary for the validation of universal 
legal norms. Recall Habermas’s claim that the disenchantment of the 
world eliminated the possibility of the objective legitimation of law.191 
This included the rejection of Kantian universalization because ob-
jective norms cannot be validated through a subjective process of 
universalization. For Habermas, universal validity at the level of jus-
tification only occurs when participants in an actual discourse under 
                                                                                                                    
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 234. 
 190. Several commentators have questioned “whether Habermas’s purely procedural 
definition of legality as legitimation is enough.” Modak-Truran, supra note 23, at 480. See, 
e.g., DAVID INGRAM, CRITICAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY 184 (1990) (“Paradoxically stated, 
if rationality boils down to acting in accordance with rules of free and fair speech, then 
with the destruction and or withering away of tradition, there would be no values and 
meanings worth talking about!”); Richard J. Bernstein, The Retrieval of the Democratic 
Ethos, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1996) (arguing that Habermas “has elaborated a 
discourse theory that relies on, and presupposes, substantial-ethical considerations” rather 
than one which is procedural or formal and “free from any taint or contamination by sub-
stantial-ethical commitments”); Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice Be 
Reconciled Through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas’s Proceduralist Paradigm 
of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 793 (1996) (contending that “even Habermas’s more nu-
anced and versatile proceduralism ultimately confronts the need to embrace contestable 
substantive normative assumptions in order to contribute to the resolution of conflicts that 
divide the members of the polity”). 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 64-77. 
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ideal speech conditions come to an intersubjective agreement about a 
norm. In the discourse of application, however, the conditions are far 
from those dictated by the ideal speech condition.  
 In a trial, for example, the judge hears the evidence, considers the 
law and the adversarial arguments of the attorneys, and then decides 
the case in the solitude of her chambers. The outcome is not deter-
mined by an agreement of all those affected (rational intersubjective 
agreement), but is imposed by the judge. In fact, the very reason for 
the trial is that the parties could not come to an agreement about 
how to resolve their dispute, despite the pretrial process of clarifying 
their claims. The parties also act strategically, seeking their own in-
terests rather than what is right or true and often insincerely mak-
ing every argument for their positions whether or not these argu-
ments would lead to what they consider to be the right result.  
 Habermas even turns what are vices in the discourse of justifica-
tion into virtues in the discourse of application. For instance, he 
claims that the adversarial symmetry between the parties in the con-
text of a trial “enables the court to play the role of an impartial third 
party.”192 By contrast, in the discourse of justification, the parties are 
supposed to aim at coming to a mutual and noncoercive consensus 
about the best outcome. Similarly, Habermas argues that time limits 
on trials are good because they ensure a decision in a timely man-
ner.193 Conversely, the argumentation process under ideal speech 
conditions is open-ended; it must proceed until all the parties find 
the argument for a particular conclusion convincing.  
 Although as a matter of practical necessity the discourse of appli-
cation must deviate from the ideal speech conditions, Habermas has 
not given any good reasons why the discourse of application in judi-
cial decisionmaking can escape the effects of the rationalization of 
society that made actual discourse and intersubjective agreement 
necessary for justifying legal norms. He has also failed to indicate 
how his dialogical conception of the discourse of application is any 
different than a monological approach to judicial decisionmaking. In 
both cases, the judge alone determines the “agreement” among the 
parties rather than an actual agreement under ideal speech condi-
tions by all the parties affected.  
 These problems pose a dilemma for Habermas. Either judicial de-
cisionmaking is legitimate independent of an actual intersubjective 
agreement (the judge knows what the parties would have agreed to 
under the ideal speech conditions), or one must just believe that judi-
cial decisionmaking will produce the agreement parties would have 
come to under ideal speech conditions without knowing this to be the 
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case. Both avenues result in serious problems for Habermas’s dis-
course theory of law. In the first case, the judicial application of legal 
norms can somehow be objectively rational while the justification of 
legal norms can only be intersubjectively rational. In the second case, 
Habermas’s discourse of application becomes circular. Like the pro-
cedures of Weber’s legal positivism, the procedures of the discourse of 
application are not justified, but merely believed to be true.194 In ei-
ther case, Habermas’s discourse of application would require sub-
stantial revision to present a coherent understanding of judicial deci-
sionmaking.  
 Second, even if the discourse of application could be redeemed, it 
would still be empty of any content that would assist judges in decid-
ing hard cases. Robert Alexy comments that Habermas is correct to 
note the hermeneutical process of going back and forth between an 
interpretation of the facts and an application of legal norms. Never-
theless, he concludes that the discourse of application “is empty, be-
cause it does not say which aspects are to be considered in what 
way.”195 Although Habermas recognizes the interrelationship be-
tween determining the facts and one’s normative lens (these aspects 
mutually change each other in the process of application), he does not 
say how the discourse of application can untangle this relationship 
such that the most appropriate norm surfaces rather than the result-
ing facts merely being construed from this normative perspective. 
Habermas rejects the solution of legal hermeneutics that a preunder-
standing can provide a way of steering “the flexible connections be-
tween norms and states of affairs in the light of received, and histori-
cally corroborated, principles.”196 Habermas claims that basing the 
application of law on a preunderstanding inappropriately makes le-
gal interpretation historically relative (i.e., ethical) rather than im-
partial (i.e., moral).197 Rather, he proposes a process of “weaving to-
gether a description of the circumstances and a concretization of gen-
eral norms.”198 The system of norms cannot deductively determine 
what the single appropriate norm is in a hard case, because the sys-
tem of norms is reconstructed in light of this decision. Further, 
Habermas emphasizes that the discourse of application determines 
                                                                                                                    
 194. This argument is analogous to Habermas’s critique of Weber’s legal positivism as 
circular that was discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. In addition, 
this argument is applicable to Habermas’s discourse of justification because he fails to ex-
plain how we can know that all the procedural requirements (the counterfactual ideal 
speech conditions) are met in an actual communicative agreement so that it is legitimate. 
For a more detailed critique of Habermas’s discourse of justification, see Modak-Truran, 
supra note 23, at 477-81.  
 195. Robert Alexy, Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Legal Discourse, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1027, 1032 (1996) (emphasis omitted). 
 196. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 200. 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 103-28.  
 198. Id. at 218. 
110  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:73 
 
“which of the prima facie valid norms is the appropriate one once all 
the significant features of the situation have been apprehended as 
fully as possible.”199 Habermas may finally be saying that we know 
which norm is the single appropriate norm when we see it.200 This so-
lution, however, would be advocating more of an intuitive approach 
to judicial decisionmaking than a coherency approach. In that case, 
Habermas’s discourse of application would derail at this point be-
cause the key determination of the single appropriate norm would be 
based on a nonrational decision rather than on a rational justifica-
tion.  
 Third, Habermas’s proposal that legal paradigms can solve the in-
determinacy of law also fails. As noted above, Habermas claims both 
that almost all legal norms are indeterminate and that the discourse 
of application itself is indeterminate because of the continual recon-
struction of legal norms into a coherent system in their application. 
His solution was to offer the notion of a legal paradigm.201 This notion 
presents several problems that undermine the impartiality and va-
lidity of the discourse of application and puts into question his dis-
course theory of law.  
 The first problem concerns choosing among the contending legal 
paradigms. Habermas notes that there is a contest among the liberal, 
social welfare, and proceduralist paradigms that must be resolved.202 
Habermas contends that the legal paradigm can limit indeterminacy 
and “guarantee a sufficient measure of legal certainty only if it is in-
tersubjectively shared by all citizens and expresses a self-
understanding of the legal community as a whole.”203 To achieve this 
shared legal paradigm, he claims that the proceduralist paradigm 
would allow this decision to be made in a democratic way, like the 
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process of justification.204 Rather than judges deciding what the legal 
paradigm should be, all affected could agree on a legal paradigm un-
der ideal speech conditions, like in the discourse of justification. This 
would only solve the indeterminacy problem, however, if the dis-
course of justification can provide a coherent, rational justification of 
the law that supports the autonomy of the law. In a prior article, I 
pointed out many reasons why Habermas’s discourse of justification 
fails to justify the procedural requirements of the ideal speech condi-
tion and the autonomy of the law.205  
 Even assuming that the discourse of justification succeeds in pro-
viding a coherent, rational justification of the law, legal paradigms 
may fail to solve the indeterminacy problem because they are inde-
terminate. Habermas notes that legal norms are not self-interpreting 
and that, except for certain application-specific legal rules, all legal 
norms are indeterminate.206 Given that the legal paradigm is a norm, 
Habermas must indicate how it differs from other legal norms so that 
its indeterminacy does not lead to an infinite regression. The liberal, 
social welfare, and proceduralist legal paradigms offered by Haber-
mas belie interpretation as application-specific rules. Alexy charac-
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 In addition, Habermas maintains that “the universalization principle acts like a knife 
that makes razor-sharp cuts between evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, 
between the good and the just.” HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 69, at 104. 
In order for a law to be impartial (i.e., not violate moral norms), Habermas’s postmeta-
physical, rational justification of law appears to depend upon the possibility of these razor-
sharp cuts. Otherwise, the ethical-political and pragmatic reasons would result in a con-
sensus based on strategic or prudential rationality like Hobbes. In that case, the consensus 
signals not a notion of intersubjective rational validity but a confluence of subjective inter-
ests. However, it is unclear how Habermas can justify his distinction between ethical-
political and pragmatic reasons and moral reasons because this is itself a claim about the 
good. “To assert that all good human purposes are in all respects historically specific is it-
self a universal evaluation of human purposes . . . . in other words, the assertion is self-
refuting.” Franklin I. Gamwell, Metaphysics and the Rationalization of Society, 23 
PROCESS STUDIES 219, 230 (1994). As a result, Habermas’s discourse theory of law fails to 
provide an impartial or rational justification for law that supports legal autonomy. For a 
more detailed critique of Habermas’s discourse of justification, see Modak-Truran, supra 
note 23, at 477-81. 
 206. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 217. 
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terizes them as “highly abstract” and claims that “they are not suffi-
cient for determining a definite decision,” but “can at most substanti-
ate prima facie priorities between principles.”207 Given this abstrac-
tion, legal paradigms cannot do the work Habermas prescribes for 
them, because they themselves are indeterminate.  
 Under these circumstances, judges would have to draw on extra-
legal norms to decide hard cases. Elsewhere, I have argued that this 
means that judges must rely on comprehensive or religious convic-
tions to validate these extralegal norms.208 Whether or not this is the 
case, Habermas claims that relying on extralegal norms would un-
dermine the rational and impartial basis of judicial decisionmak-
ing.209 It would shift the justification of norms from the discourse of 
justification to the discourse of application. As with legal hermeneu-
tics, this would allow judges to rely on ethical and historically rela-
tive legal norms rather than discursively justified or impartially ra-
tional ones. Thus, if legal paradigms are indeterminate, Habermas’s 
discourse of application fails to give a rational account of judicial de-
cisionmaking in hard cases.  
 Finally, even if legal paradigms are determinate, this raises the 
issue concerning how to define the nature and scope of legal para-
digms. Habermas claims that “[a] paradigm is discerned primarily in 
important court decisions and usually equated with the judge’s im-
plicit image of society.”210 Expressions like “social ideal,” “social 
model,” and “social vision” have also become accepted ways of refer-
ring to a social epoch’s legal paradigm.211 He observes that “[s]uch 
expressions refer to those implicit ideas or images of one’s own soci-
ety that provide a perspective for the practices of making and apply-
ing law.”212 Following Henry J. Steiner’s account of judicial social vi-
sions, Habermas recognizes that this implicit image of society entails 
the judge’s understanding of all of society. It includes the judge’s im-
ages of “socioeconomic structure, patterns of social interaction, moral 
goals, and political ideologies.”213 It also includes a judge’s beliefs 
about social actors such as “their character, behavior, and capacities” 
                                                                                                                    
 207. Alexy, supra note 195, at 1032. 
 208. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law, supra note 10 (arguing that the indeter-
minacy of the United States’ law requires judges to rely on religious or comprehensive con-
victions to justify their deliberation about hard cases fully, even though they can only pro-
vide a partial justification of their decisions in their written opinions in terms of noncom-
prehensive legal norms because of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).  
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40. 
 210. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 16, at 392. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. (quoting HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE 
COURTS 92 (1987)). 
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and her beliefs about things like accidents, including “their causes, 
volume[,] and toll.”214  
 The scope of this social vision is very broad and includes not only 
descriptive components (empirical claims about the current condi-
tions of society) but also normative components (normative claims 
about how society should be organized and how citizens should con-
duct themselves). Habermas even claims that legal paradigms have a 
“world-disclosive function” in that they “open up interpretive per-
spectives from which the principles of the constitutional state (in a 
specific interpretation) can be related to the social context as a 
whole.”215 Moreover, he argues that the legal paradigm “expresses a 
self-understanding of the legal community as a whole.”216  
 With this broad scope, it is hard to distinguish social visions or le-
gal paradigms from comprehensive or religious convictions about au-
thentic human existence.217 For instance, Schubert Ogden defines re-
ligion as “the primary form of culture in terms of which we human 
beings explicitly ask and answer the existential question of the 
meaning of ultimate reality for us.”218 He clarifies that the existential 
question concerns the nature or meaning of “authentic human exis-
tence” (i.e., how we should “understand ourselves and others in rela-
tion to the whole”).219 The existential question is thus the question 
which is presupposed by all other questions.220 It is the “comprehen-
sive question” concerning “what is the valid comprehensive self-
understanding,” or “comprehensive human purpose?”221 Religion ex-
                                                                                                                    
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 437. 
 216. Id. at 223. 
 217. This summary is taken from a longer account of the nature of religion in the con-
text of judicial decisionmaking that is based on the work of Shubert Ogden, Franklin I. 
Gamwell, and other academics in the religion academy. See Modak-Truran, Reenchanting 
the Law, supra note 10, at 721-28, 799-806. 
 218. SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION OR ARE THERE MANY? 
5 (1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE]. 
 219. Id. at 6. In more technical terms, the existential or religious question involves a 
metaphysical aspect and an ethical aspect that are closely related. In its metaphysical as-
pect, “it asks about the ultimate reality of our own existence in relation to others and the 
whole.” Id. at 17. Unlike metaphysics proper, which determines the structure of ultimate 
reality itself, the metaphysical aspect of religion tells us the meaning of ultimate reality for 
us. In addition, in its ethical aspect, religion “asks about our authentic self-
understanding.” Id. at 18. Here again, there is a difference between ethics proper, which 
asks how we are to act, and the ethical aspect of religion, which tells us how we are to un-
derstand ourselves. Moreover, each specific religion answers both the metaphysical and 
ethical aspects of the existential question. 
 220. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN POLITICS 
AND THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 22-23 (1995) (“[E]very human activity asks and an-
swers, at least implicitly, the comprehensive question, namely, what is the valid compre-
hensive self-understanding? . . . What is the comprehensive human purpose?”). 
 221. Id. Gamwell further recognizes that his “definition and discussion of religion is 
nothing other than an attempt to appropriate [Ogden’s] formulations for the purposes of 
the present inquiry.” Id. at 15 n.1. 
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plicitly answers the existential or comprehensive question by provid-
ing the “concepts and symbols whose express function is to mediate 
authentic self-understanding.”222 In other words, religion includes a 
comprehensive evaluation of human activity in terms of the nature of 
existence to determine “how human activity as such ought to make a 
difference to the larger reality of which it is a part.”223  
 Accordingly, religion not only includes the recognized world relig-
ions of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but 
it also includes humanism, capitalism (when proposed as a norma-
tive rather than as a positive theory),224 communism, and other so-
called secular answers to the existential question. This means that 
there is and always has been a plurality of religions or comprehen-
sive self-understandings. Moreover, all human activity (including le-
gal interpretation) is either explicitly or implicitly informed by a plu-
rality of religious convictions.  
 If legal paradigms cannot be distinguished from religious or com-
prehensive convictions, Habermas’s discourse of application would 
strangely be requiring judges to rely on something like comprehen-
sive convictions in their decisionmaking. By requiring judges to rely 
on an official legal paradigm or “self-understanding of the legal 
community,” Habermas’s discourse theory of law would in effect re-
quire establishing a comprehensive conviction in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment. In addition, this would 
undermine Habermas’s whole attempt to provide an intersubjectively 
rational justification of law and violate his normative understanding 
of secularization. Recall that Habermas’s normative account of secu-
larization requires that the justification and application of law must 
be sealed off from comprehensive and religious convictions in order to 
be rational. According to Habermas, comprehensive and religious 
convictions are not rational, because they cannot be intersubjectively 
validated.  
                                                                                                                    
 222. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 218, at 8. 
 223. GAMWELL, supra note 220, at 25. 
 224. See David R. Loy, The Religion of the Market, 65 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 275, 275 
(1997). After adopting a functionalist view of religion “as what grounds us by teaching us 
what the world is, and what our rôle in the world is.” Loy argues that 
our present economic system should also be understood as our religion, 
because it has come to fulfill a religious function for us. The discipline 
of economics is less a science than the theology of that religion, and its 
god, the Market, has become a vicious circle of ever-increasing produc-
tion and consumption by pretending to offer a secular salvation. The 
collapse of communism—best understood as a capitalist “heresy”—
makes it more apparent that the Market is becoming the first truly 
world religion, binding all corners of the globe more and more tightly 
into a worldview and set of values whose religious role we overlook only 
because we insist on seeing them as “secular.” 
Id. 
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 If solving the indeterminacy problem in the discourse of applica-
tion requires judges to rely on comprehensive or religious convic-
tions, Habermas would be solving the indeterminacy problem at the 
expense of making judicial decisionmaking, on his account, nonra-
tional. Like legal hermeneutics, the discourse theory of law would be 
proposing that judges decide hard cases based on something that is 
ethical and historical rather than moral and impartial. Unless legal 
paradigms can be distinguished from comprehensive convictions, the 
discourse of application cannot be rationally validated, and the nor-
mative “secularization of law” would paradoxically require establish-
ing the legal paradigm as the comprehensive or religious norm for 
resolving hard cases. Habermas’s discourse of application would then 
fail to seal off judicial decisionmaking from religious or comprehen-
sive convictions that would undermine his core descriptive and nor-
mative claims about the secularization of law.  
 Even if legal paradigms can be distinguished from comprehensive 
convictions, Habermas’s discourse theory of law is incoherent and re-
quires an establishment of a comprehensive or religious conviction. 
Habermas’s discourse theory of justification and application rely on 
his claim that all comprehensive convictions are not rational and 
cannot be intersubjectively validated. This claim constitutes a com-
prehensive evaluation of all comprehensive convictions.225 However, 
this claim is self-contradictory because it presupposes what it de-
nies—the possibility of rational comprehensive evaluation. In addi-
tion, those with differing comprehensive convictions would reject this 
comprehensive evaluation and the discourse theory of law. The dis-
course theory of law would not be supported by an intersubjective 
agreement. In order for the discourse theory of law to gain accep-
tance, this comprehensive evaluation would have to be established as 
part of the law. This would result in a violation of the Establishment 
Clause, and the discourse theory of law would fail to provide for the 
justification and application of law independent of any particular 
comprehensive conviction.  
 The notion of legal paradigms thus presents a problem for 
Habermas’s discourse theory of law, either because it is indetermi-
nate, or because it is determinate. In the former case, the law would 
not be autonomous from morality, politics, and religion, and judges 
would not have a rational basis for deciding hard cases. In the latter 
case, Habermas’s discourse theory of law is incoherent and requires 
an establishment of religion, whether or not legal paradigms can be 
distinguished from comprehensive convictions. Consequently, 
Habermas’s discourse theory of law fails to provide a coherent theory 
for reconciling the secularization of law with legal indeterminacy, 
                                                                                                                    
 225. Gamwell, Metaphysics and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 205, at 230. 
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which suggests that the simultaneous endorsement of these two as-
sertions in contemporary legal theory is misguided.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The failure of Habermas’s discourse theory of law represents a 
watershed moment for contemporary legal theory regarding its most 
widely held, but least examined assumption—the secularization of 
the law. Unlike most contemporary legal theorists, Habermas fully 
realizes that his theory presupposes both a descriptive and norma-
tive theory of secularization. Descriptively, he appropriates Weber’s 
theory about the rationalization of society with some modifications. 
Once the metaphysical and religious legitimation of law has been 
eliminated, he argues for a secular legitimation of law (i.e., norma-
tive theory of secularization) via communicative reason in the dis-
course of justification based on a voluntary, intersubjective agree-
ment among all those affected. Communicative action takes up the 
normative task left open by the secularization or disenchantment of 
the law.  
 At the same time, Habermas acknowledges the widely held de-
scriptive assumption that the law is indeterminate. Realizing that 
the strong legal formalism proposed by Weber is untenable, Haber-
mas proposes a weak formalism based on Dworkin’s interpretive the-
ory of law and supplemented by other legal philosophers. Dworkin’s 
theory argues that legal principles provide resources internal to the 
law for judges to construct a coherent set of legal norms to decide 
hard cases independently of extralegal norms, including personal 
moral, political, and religious convictions.  
 However, coherence theories like Dworkin’s result in the entire 
system of legal norms being indeterminate because the retroactive 
reconfiguration of the system of legal norms in every hard case cre-
ates a ripple in the system of legal norms. Habermas tries to remedy 
this indeterminacy with the notion of legal paradigms. Legal para-
digms attempt to prevent the discourse of application from reopening 
the question of validity in hard cases. Moreover, Habermas argues 
that the impartial application of the law via legal paradigms prohib-
its judges from having the discretion to rely on personal moral, po-
litical, and religious convictions.  
 Despite these aspirations, legal paradigms fail to maintain the 
secularization of the law either because they are indeterminate (al-
low reliance on religious or comprehensive convictions) or because 
they are determinate (require reliance on a nonrational comprehen-
sive conviction, which makes the discourse theory incoherent and re-
quires an establishment of religion). Given Habermas’s failure, con-
temporary legal theory needs to recognize that the widespread accep-
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tance of legal indeterminacy calls into question the secularization of 
law as it is currently understood. Weak legal formalism, whether 
Dworkin’s or Habermas’s version, falls short, and going back to 
strong legal formalism is no longer possible. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that the current consensus about legal indeterminacy will 
fall out of favor. The consensus is so widespread that even contempo-
rary legal formalists, like Ernst Weinrib, embrace it.226 Consequently, 
legal theory must rethink its assumptions about the relationship be-
tween law and religion to embrace the desecularization of law.  
 Desecularization of the law does not suggest returning to an ex-
plicitly religious legitimation of law. Religionists consciously or un-
consciously presuppose that a particular religion or religious tradi-
tion legitimates the law. Classical religionists explicitly adopt a theo-
cratic model of legitimating the law. For example, Article Four of the 
Iranian Constitution requires that all laws “must be based on Islamic 
criteria.”227 Contemporary religionists in the United States often echo 
Justice Douglas’s claim in Zorach v. Clauson that “[w]e are a reli-
gious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”228 Re-
ligionists urge that federal and state government officials recognize 
this religious foundation by posting the Ten Commandments, dis-
playing crèches on government property, keeping “under God” in the 
pledge of allegiance, citing scripture in judicial opinions, and allow-
ing prayer and the teaching of intelligent design in public schools. 
These claims have fostered allegations of advocating a theocracy in 
America.229 While the charge of theocracy is overstated, it is accurate 
in the sense that religionists attempt to impose a de facto Christian 
                                                                                                                    
 226. Weinrib, supra note 14.  
 227. ROBERT L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 164 (1995) (emphasis added). 
This theocratic model has been particularly hard on women. For instance, Amina Lawal 
was sentenced to death by stoning for “adultery” in Nigeria under Shari’a criminal law, 
which had been adopted by twelve North African states in 2000. See Madhavi Sunder, 
Beauty Marred: The “Miss World” Riots, A Stoning Sentence, and the Conflict Between Re-
ligious and Secular Law in Nigeria, FindLaw’s Writ, Dec. 5, 2002, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021205_sunder.html. Ironically, the charge of 
“adultery” against Amina Lawal was for having a child out-of-wedlock with the man she 
subsequently married. See Nelly Van Doorn-Harder, On Not Throwing Stones—Christian 
and Muslim Conflict in Nigeria, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 8, 2003, at 8.   
 228. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
 229. The dichotomy between religionists and secularists has been particularly evident 
in recent books and articles about the contemporary political landscape. See, e.g., 
MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM (2006); 
DAMON LINKER, THE THEOCONS: SECULAR AMERICA UNDER SIEGE (2006); KEVIN PHILLIPS, 
AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND 
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AMERICA: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S PLANS FOR THE REST OF US (2006); Ross Douthat, Theoc-
racy, Theocracy, Theocracy, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2006, at 23 (discussing most of these 
books). 
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religious foundation on “the world’s most religiously diverse na-
tion.”230  
 Alternatively, I argue elsewhere that the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment and a proper understanding of religious plural-
ism prohibit the law from explicitly adopting a religious legitima-
tion.231 The text of the law must remain secularized. Nevertheless, 
the secularized text of the law does not mean that the law has an 
autonomous secular foundation (i.e., secularism).232 Secularism con-
stitutes a comprehensive or religious justification that competes not 
only with Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, 
but also with humanism, capitalism, communism, and other so-called 
secular answers to the existential question. To remain secularized, 
the text of the law cannot adopt any of these as a comprehensive jus-
tification for the law. 
 However, the law implies religious or comprehensive convictions 
about authentic human existence. The legitimation of law is provided 
by a plurality of religious and comprehensive convictions which must 
always remain implicit. For example, many religious or comprehen-
sive convictions support the legal prohibition of murder, but the text 
of the law does not explicitly adopt any of these religious justifica-
tions. In other words, the text of the law does not provide a religious 
or comprehensive justification for prohibiting murder, but only im-
plies them. Religious pluralism and the Establishment Clause re-
quire this normative theory of secularization. Consequently, despite 
the secularization of the text of the law, this new paradigm results in 
a legitimate plurality of religious convictions implicitly legitimating 
the law and thereby desecularizing the law. 
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